

SHOULD STOP COMPLAINING TO THEM, ABOUT HOW THEY ARE CALCULATING AND ENFORCING MY 2002 IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND THAT BY REPEATEDLY FALLING-BACK TO SAME, THEY ARE REFUSING APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE OF STATUTORY DUE PROCESS, ACTIONABLE ONLY BY A COMPETENT COURT (TO EXPLAIN/DEFINE MY IMPOSED SENTENCE [74.], IN AND BY A COURT, EXISTING ONLY IN CH. III [3.]),

1584.

THE DECISION TO 'EXCEED THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF THAT WHICH IS PARENTALLY DELEGATED AND ASSIGNED BY [1.], BEING CHAPTER II [3.], GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION', THEREBY FRAUDULENTLY GIVING ITSELF FALSE-AUTHORITY AND FALSE-JURISDICTION, TO PUBLISH ITS OWN (CH. II [3.]), CREATED INTERPRETATION OF THE CALCULATED 'NPD DATE' OF MY 2002 JUDGMENT ([74.]), AS THE REPLACEMENT FOR THE ONLY LAWFULLY CREATED 'NPD DATE', WHICH WAS CREATED, AND PUBLISHED, BY THE OWNER OF JUDGMENT [74.] (BEING THE FULL COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, SITTING IN THE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, AND EXISTING ONLY IN THE REALM OF CH. III [3.]), [SEE TEXT AT 938 TO 941, IBID.],

1585.

THE DECISION TO 'CARRY-OUT/ENFORCE AN INCARCERATION SENTENCE AGAINST ME WHICH WAS NOT CREATED BY THE FULL COURT IN 2002 (THE COURT CREATED AND IMPOSED AND DELIVERED [74.]), BUT INSTEAD BY SA GOVERNMENT IN 2002 [SEE TEXT AT 938 TO 941, IBID.], AND IN SO DOING IT ALSO DECIDED TO VIOLATE CUL AND ATL' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, IBID.],

1586.

WHICH ARE SOME OF THE MORE OBVIOUS INCORPORATED ELEMENTS OF THE SA GOVERNMENTS' FRAUDULENT DECISIONS, FROM WITHIN A 'NON-COMPETENT ENVIRONMENT', UNDER 'FALSE AUTHORITY' AND HOLDING NO JURISDICTION IN CH. II ([3.]), TO MAKE AND CARRY-OUT SAME [SEE TEXT AT 1565, IBID.], AGAINST ME OR AGAINST MY COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE [74.].

1587.

ONE PARTICULAR FEATURE THROUGHOUT THIS COMPLAINT REPORT DOCUMENT, CONCERNING MY COMPLAINTS ABOUT HOW THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA IS ^{EFFECTING} A PRISON SENTENCE AGAINST ME, BOTH, DUE TO MY 2002 RE-SENTENCING [74.], AND, STATUTE AMENDMENTS TO CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, SA [85.], SINCE 1994, (IN PARTICULAR, [46.], AND THE INSTIGATION OF THE 'SUBSTITUTE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT', THE PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION (PARC) [SEE TEXT AT 150, 151, 153, 172. 181D],
 1588. IS, AN INDICATION (FROM ME), THAT ACTIONS WERE CREATED, EFFECTED AND CONSEQUENTED
 BY THE SA PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.1]), AND SA GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1]), WITHOUT
 1589. COMPETENT GOVERNANCE¹⁶, TO ENSURE THAT RESPECTIVE BILLS BEING DEBATED
 [51., 140., 162., 179. AND 187.], IN PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.1]), DID NOT CONTAIN ANY
~~AM~~ AMENDMENT PROPOSALS THAT WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL ([1.1]), IN THEIR OPERATION IF
 1590. ASSENTED, INCLUDING, 'ACTING OUTSIDE STATUTORY JURISDICTION' [28.], AND, 'WERE NOT SO
AMBIGUOUS AND/OR ARBITRARY SO AS TO ENVELOPE 'LIFERS' WHO COULD NOT LAWFULLY
 (TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE STANDARD [1. AND 3.]), BE AFFECTED BY SUCH
 1591. 'PROPOSED' AMENDMENTS (IF THEY WERE ASSENTED), DUE TO (FOR EXAMPLE), 'A VIOLATION OF
SUBSTANTIVE (ACCRUED), RIGHTS, WHICH WERE ALREADY IMPOSED UPON RESPECTIVE
 SENTENCED LIFERS BY THEIR COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT' (OR ~~OR~~ ^{EVEN} RE-SENTENCING
 COURT, USING MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], AS A FOUNDATION EXAMPLE [78., 80., 77.,
 139., 137. AND 126.]), AND WERE THEREFORE OWNED BY SAME (SENTENCED), LIFERS AS
EXERCISEABLE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS (EXERCISEABLE AND ARGUEABLE IN THE
 ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT ([1. AND 3.]), PLACE, IN THE ENTIRE
 NATION OF AUSTRALIA, BEING, A COMPETENT COURT), AND ALREADY PROTECTED
 1592. AS SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS (SO THAT NO ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION OF SA GOVERNMENT COULD
 SIMPLY AND WITHOUT SPECIFIC COURT JUDGMENT, JUST INVALIDATE/EXTINGUISH SUCH
 SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS FROM THE RESPECTIVE LIFERS' OPERATIONAL USE OF/OBSERVANCE OF/
 1593. APPLICATION OF), 'SO THAT ANY SUCH AMENDMENT PROPOSALS WERE WRITTEN/WORDER IN SUCH
 A WAY THAT FUTURE OPERATIONS OF (ASSENTED) AMENDMENT PROPOSALS, TOWARDS CERTAIN
 SENTENCED LIFERS (DEPENDING ON SENTENCE IMPOSED), DID NOT, EVEN INADVERTANTLY,
 1594. ENCROACH UPON SUCH EXERCISEABLE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS (INCLUDING SUCH ACCRUED
 RIGHTS DEFINING, CHARACTERISING HOW RESPECTIVE LIFERS' 'NPP DATE' AND 'NPP OF TIME',
 AND, DEFINING HOW, WHEN AND UNDER WHAT SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES RESPECTIVE LIFERS'
 1595. 'PAROLE FINISHES/ENDS' (IS "WHOLLY SATISFIED")), THAT COULD ONLY BE COMPETENTLY ARGUED,
 DEBATED, CONSIDERED AND ALTERED TOWARDS A SPECIFIC LIFERS' SENTENCE, BY A COMPETENT
 COURT (EXISTING ONLY WITHIN CH. III [1. AND 3.]), WHICH DRAWS GOVERNANCE PROTECTIONS
 FROM STATUTE [28.] AND COMMON LAW AUTHORITIES [64. (PARAS. 92, 93, 94, 117.)]¹⁷,

AND, [RETURN TO 1588.]

1596 TO ENSURE (VIA SUCH COMPETENT GOVERNANCE),¹⁶ THAT ALL OPERATIONAL ACTIONS, OF AND

BY, SA GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1]), WHILE 'ENFORCING' [SEE TEXT AT 1540. 1BID.] A

1597. COURTS IMPOSED SENTENCE [SEE TEXT AT 1541. 1BID.] UPON A SENTENCED LIFER (AS

THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT [1.3. AND 85.1, [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 1BID.]])

AND PERMITTED BODY/ENTITY, WITHIN THE REGION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA,

SO THAT IT CAN'T BE PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.1]), IT CAN'T BE THE COURTS (TO APPLY AND

OPERATE [85.1, AS COURTS ONLY HOLD CH. III [3.1] JURISDICTION), THEREFORE MUST BE

1598. THE SA GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1]), WERE INTENDING TO BE CARRIED-OUT, WERE BEING

CARRIED-OUT, AND OPERATIONAL ACTIONS ALREADY DONE, HAVE BEEN CARRIED-OUT, IN SUCH A

CONSTITUTIONALLY (1.1), COMPETENT AND COMPLIANT MANNER, THAT THERE WOULD

NOT AND COULD NOT EXIST ANY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONAL ACTION WHICH, IN ITS

OPERATIONAL APPLICATION/EFFECTATION, WAS ILLEGAL, UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1.1),

JURISDICTIONALLY ERRONEOUS/ULTRA VIRES [64, 65, 82, 83, AND 213.], AS SUCH

IMPROPER CONDUCT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE AGAINST SAID SENTENCED LIFER, IF SAID

COMPETENT GOVERNANCE ACTUALLY PERFORMED ITS PROTECTIVE AND CONTROLLING

MASTER FUNCTIONS (WHICH INCLUDED INTRINSIC, COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT, OF

OPERATIONAL ACTIONS, THOSE PENDING, THOSE BEING PERFORMED, AND THOSE ALREADY DONE),

THAT WAY ALL RELEVANT LAWS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE PROTECTED IN PROPER

APPLICATION OF THE PROCESS ACCORDING TO COMPETENT LAW,¹⁷

PLUS, [RETURN TO 1596.]

1599. TO ENSURE (VIA SUCH COMPETENT GOVERNANCE),¹⁶ THAT ALL OPERATIONAL ACTIONS, OF AND

BY, SA GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.1]), WHILE 'ENFORCING' [SEE TEXT AT 1540. 1BID.]

A COURTS IMPOSED SENTENCE [SEE TEXT AT 1541. 1BID.] UPON ME, IN ACCORDANCE

1600. WITH AND PURSUANT TO SUCH SENTENCE (IMPOSED 2002 [74.1]), WERE INTENDING TO BE

CARRIED-OUT, WERE BEING CARRIED-OUT, AND OPERATIONAL ACTIONS ALREADY DONE, HAVE BEEN

CARRIED-OUT, IN SUCH A CONSTITUTIONALLY (1.1), COMPETENT AND COMPLIANT

MANNER, THAT THERE WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT EXIST ANY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONAL

ACTION WHICH, IN ITS OPERATIONAL APPLICATION/EFFECTATION, WAS ILLEGAL,

UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1.1), JURISDICTIONALLY ERRONEOUS/ULTRA VIRES [64, 65, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000]

83. AND 213.] AS SUCH IMPROPER CONDUCT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE AGAINST ME (BY, AND DUE TO/CONSEQUENTIAL TO, THE SPECIFIC ACTIONS OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT ACTING AS CHAPTER II [3.] 'ENFORCER' OF IMPOSED SENTENCE [SEE TEXT AT 1540, IBID.] IF SAID COMPETENT GOVERNANCE ACTUALLY PERFORMED ITS PROTECTIVE AND CONTROLLING MASTER FUNCTIONS (WHICH INCLUDED INTRINSIC 'COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT', OF OPERATIONAL ACTIONS, THOSE PENDING, THOSE BEING PERFORMED, AND THOSE ALREADY DONE), THAT WAY ALL RELEVANT LAWS, RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE PROTECTED IN PROPER APPLICATION OF DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO COMPETENT LAW 21,

CONSEQUENTIALLY, [RETURN TO 1587, 1588.]

1601. WITHOUT A REQUISITE COMPETENT GOVERNANCE, TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF AND OVER THE SA PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.]), AND SA GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS (PRIOR TO ACTIONING), THEIR CONDUCT AND THEIR ACHIEVED OUTCOMES (BORNE FROM INCOMPETENT GOVERNANCE), HAVE RENDERED THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA AS AN ISLAND ENTITY WHICH IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]), IN ITS CURRENT FORM (BY THIS, I REFER TO SPECIFIC LEGISLATION RELATING TO 'LIFERS' (CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING ACT, CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT), AND STATE GOVERNMENT BUSINESS/OPERATIONAL ACTIONS AGAINST SPECIFIC 'LIFERS', INCLUDING ME (RE [74.])), AS I HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO WITHIN THIS
1602. DOCUMENT. THE FAILURE OF COMPETENT GOVERNANCE, OVER 'CONDUCT BY PARLIAMENTS AND GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA', SINCE AT LEAST 1994 (AS DESCRIBED HEREIN), HAS ENABLED CREATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, SUCH AS ME (ILLEGAL STATE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, AGAINST ME). [SEE TEXT AT 1421 TO 1433 INCLUSIVE, AND, 1482 TO 1485 INCLUSIVE, IBID.]

1603. A SENTENCED 'LIFER' (IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA), SHOULD ONLY BE 'SENTENCED' ACCORDING TO STATUTORY PROCEDURES, AND THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO CREATE AND IMPOSE A 'SENTENCE' UPON A PERSON UNDER SOUTH AUSTRALIAN COMPETENT JURISDICTION (SUCH AS A PERSON CONVICTED OF 'CAPITAL' CRIME, SUCH AS MURDER), THE PROPER JURISDICTION MUST BE EMPLOYED SO AS TO LAWFULLY PERFORM THE INTENDED TASK, OF 'SENTENCING' SAID PERSON CONVICTED OF 'CAPITAL' CRIME (EVEN THOUGH THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE

FOR A PERSON CONVICTED OF 'MURDER', IS THE PERIOD COMMONLY SPOKEN BY SENTENCING JUDGES, AS 'LIFE', WHICH, UNTIL LATE 1970's TO EARLY 1980's, OPERATIONALLY CAME UNDER THE COMMONLY TERMED "GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE" ([29.]),

1604. IN THE EARLY-MID 1980's, THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF THE STATUTORY APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THE REMISSION SYSTEM [139.] (SEEN IN ANDREWS [207.], PARAGRAPH
1605. 20. THEREIN), BECAME THE NEW SENTENCING STANDARDS, HOWEVER, THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE FOR 'MURDER' REMAINED, IN WORDS AT ~~LEAST~~ LEAST, AS A SENTENCE
1606. OF "LIFE", EVEN THOUGH, BY STATUTORY APPLICATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THE SAID REMISSION SYSTEM, WHERE A 'NPP' WAS IMPOSED BY THE COURT AS PART OF SENTENCE, THE ACTUAL AND EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF INCARCERATION OF SUCH 'LIFER', WAS
1607. SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THE TERM OF THE LIFER'S NATURAL LIFE (THEREBY DISTINCTLY DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN THE WORDS "LIFE IMPRISONMENT" (PER MANDATORY STATUTE HEAD SENTENCE FOR MURDER CONTINUING IN OPERATION, AS "LIFE"), AND THE 'ACTUAL PERIOD OF TIME', WHICH, FOR MOST LIFERS DURING ACTUAL OPERATION OF THE REMISSION SYSTEM, WAS NOWHERE NEAR THE TERM OF LIFE, OR, WHAT MIGHT BE THEIR INDIVIDUAL TERM
1608. OF LIFE (AS DESCRIBED IN [50.], AT PARAGRAPH 49. THEREIN, "THE AVERAGE PERIOD SERVED BY PRISONERS SENTENCED TO LIFE IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA WAS GIVEN AS 13 YEARS 3 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT.", THEN COUPLED TO THE MAXIMUM STATUTORY TERM FOR PAROLE, AS DESCRIBED IN [50.], AT PARAGRAPH 4. THEREIN, "IF THAT OCCURS, THE OFFENDER WILL CONTINUE ON PAROLE FOR A RECOMMENDED PERIOD OF BETWEEN THREE AND TEN YEARS, AT THE EXPIRATION OF WHICH THE SENTENCE WILL BE TAKEN TO HAVE BEEN WHOLLY SATISFIED ⁴. THE COMBINED DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE, TO FIX A NON-PAROLE PERIOD, AND THE EXECUTIVE, TO RELEASE A PRISONER ON PAROLE, TOGETHER WITH THE STATUTORY CONSEQUENCES OF RELEASE ON PAROLE [MAXIMUM PAROLE OF 10. YEARS, AT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT 1982 (SA) ss 67(6), 70.], MEAN THAT THE PROPOSITION THAT THE PENALTY FOR MURDER IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA IS MANDATORY LIFE IMPRISONMENT
1609. IS AN INCOMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE TRUE POSITION. ¹⁹⁹), IN WHICH CASE, SAID DISTINCT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MANDATORY HEAD SENTENCE OF 'LIFE IN PRISON', AND THE TRUE SENTENCE APPLIED AND OBSERVED BY STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), AGAINST A LIFER WHOSE IMPOSED COMPETENT SENTENCE WAS ACCORDING TO/PURSUANT TO THE

1610. "Automatic Parole Act" (seen in Andrews [207.1, paragraph 15, therein, also, at paragraph 20, therein, "those sections of the original Act were repealed and substituted by the Automatic Parole Act in 1984. A new s. 66 provided for the automatic release on parole of all prisoners... and particularly within said paragraph 20, full text, the Correctional Services Act Amendment Act 1984 (SA) s. 39, amending Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA).), basically meant that, no matter the fact that the head sentence was statute "life", the true operational meaning of such a life's imposed sentence, only gave incarcerative calculation weight to length of imposed 'NPP', date designated by sentencing court from which to start length of imposed 'NPP', operational effect of "Automatic Parole Act", particularly that described at [126.1, [see text at 1414, 1415, ibid], [see text at 1582, 1594, ibid], date on which parole-release started, includes when 'NPP' calculated to end, date which is 10 years after start date of parole [100. and 101.1, ss. 67(6)(a)(ii), 67(7), and, up until early 2016, the operational effect of CCS Act (185.1), s. 70, headed "duration of parole for life prisoners", therein (especially), s. 70(2) "On the expiry of the parole of a person pursuant to subsection (1), the sentence of imprisonment will, subject to this part, be taken to have been wholly satisfied."
1617. ⑥ date designated by statute as maximum 10 years after parole-release, 15, pursuant to competent sentence imposed by competent sentencing court, upon such a sentenced/re-sentenced life (and thereby consistent with only the sentencing standards embodied within, and constitutionally [1.1, protected by, the imposed sentence [see text at 846, 847, ibid]), the constitutionally [1.1] competent date on which (no later than midnight on said date), the imposed courts sentence must finish, and must (as an absolute, an imperative, see "shall") [30.1, as qualification of/for the imperative), be observed and also accepted by 'enforcer' of imposed sentence (the state government of South Australia, operating competent jurisdiction of chapter II (13.1), only [see text at 1537, 1538, 1539, 1540, 1541, ibid], conducting the constitutional [1.1], obligation of the state government, which forms part of the 'business operations of the state

GOVERNMENT', WHICH IS, 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER'⁹, AS THAT WHICH, CONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]), COMPETENT JURISDICTION ([82. AND 83.]), IT HAS NO OTHER CHOICE/DISCRETION 'OPEN' TO IT, OTHER THAN 'ENFORCER' [SEE TEXT AT 1540. IBID], OF THE 'IMPOSER'S' [SEE TEXT AT 1541. IBID], DELIVERED SENTENCE.

1619. (THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH THE LENGTH OF PAROLE WHICH COULD LAWFULLY^{BE} BURDENED UPON SUCH A LIFER, WHO WAS COMPETENTLY SENTENCED TO SENTENCING STANDARDS WHICH OPERATIONALLY SAT WITHIN THE STATUTORY ENVELOPE, OF THE "AUTOMATIC

1620. PAROLE ACT" (THE REMISSION SYSTEM [SEE TEXT AT 1604. IBID], WHICH WAS AMENDED BY [46.], ONLY TO BECOME OPERATIONAL ON 1-8-1994, BUT WHICH I ACCUSE (WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT), OF BEING FRAUDULENTLY ASSENTED [15.], CONSEQUENTIAL TO SOME EXTENT BECAUSE OF SOME OF ITS AMENDMENTS VIOLATING CONSTRUCTION BOUNDARIES AND LIMITS

1621. [28.]), WAS RANGED AT MINIMUM THREE YEARS AND MAXIMUM TEN YEARS⁹ (WHICH PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT DISCRETION FOR BOARD ~~AND~~ AND GOVERNOR [29.], OF UP TO SEVEN YEARS FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION (CH. II [3.]), OF JURISDICTIONALLY

1622. ALLOWABLE 'PAROLE PERIOD OF TIME'⁹, ONCE THE SAID LIFER HAD IMPOSED UPON THEM BY THE COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT, THEIR SENTENCE, PER 'REMISSION SYSTEM SENTENCING STANDARDS', THE COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT, PROTECTED BY [1.] [SEE TEXT AT 1537, 1538. IBID], NOT

1623. ONLY ENSURED AND COMPELLED THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (OPERATING BY WAY OF 'THE BUSINESS OPERATIONS OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT', WITHIN THE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARY OF CH. II ([3.]) ONLY [SEE TEXT AT 1540. IBID]), TO CUSTODIALLY ENFORCE ONLY THE PENALTY OF SENTENCE ACTUALLY IMPOSED

1624. BY SAID SENTENCING COURT [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBID] (SO THAT NO GREATER SENTENCE PENALTY COULD LAWFULLY BE ACTIONED/CARRIED-OUT AGAINST SAID SENTENCED LIFER, THAN WAS CONTRIBUTIVELY CONSIDERED, ACKNOWLEDGED, UNDERSTOOD AND CALCULATED WITHIN ALL RELEVANT SENTENCING FACTORS, WHICH, UPON THE COURT'S DELIVERY OF ITS SENTENCE DETERMINATION, BECAME THE COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE (CH. III [3.], [SEE TEXT AT 847, 846. IBID]), WHICH COULD ONLY THEREAFTER BE AMENDED, SUCH AS TO 'INCREASE' OR 'DECREASE' SAID COURT'S IMPOSED LENGTH OF 'NPP' (① [SEE TEXT AT 1612. IBID]), BY STATUTORY APPROACH TO

- THE COMPETENT COURT (WHICH ONLY EXISTS WITHIN THE FUNCTIONAL REALM OF CH. III [3.]), SUCH AS PER CLCA [31.], BY RESPECTIVE LIFER IN WANTING TO 'DECREASE' IMPOSED LENGTH OF 'NPP', OR, PER CLSA [45., 38. AND 40.], BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), IN WANTING TO 'INCREASE' IMPOSED LENGTH OF 'NPP'), BUT, ALSO INTRINSIC TO IMPOSED SENTENCE, WAS THE COURT'S QUALIFICATION THAT THE TRUE EFFECT OF ③ [SEE TEXT AT 1614. IBID], WAS TO 'SUBSTANTIVELY RIGHT' RESPECTIVE SENTENCE WITH A PROTECTED END OF SENTENCE DATE (WITHIN THE STATUTORY FEATURES (ACCRUED/SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS), OF AUTOMATIC PAROLE, PLUS REMISSIONS, PLUS MAXIMUM TEN YEAR PAROLE PERIOD), WHICH, UNLESS RESPECTIVE LIFER DIED PRIOR TO TEN YEARS AFTER DATE PAROLE STARTED, SAID LIFER WOULD "WHOLLY" SATISFY THE ENTIRE SENTENCE, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE FOR MURDER CONVICTION
1626. BEING "LIFE IMPRISONMENT" [SEE TEXT AT 1615 (④), 1616 (⑤), IBID], AND, FUNDAMENTALLY, SUCH PROTECTIONS WERE EMBODIED WITHIN THE 'IMPOSED'
1627. SENTENCE, SO THAT, FOR 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 1618. IBID], TO FAIL/REFUSE TO OBSERVE AND APPLY ANY OF SAID LIFER'S IMPOSED (AND THEREBY CONSTITUTIONALLY [1.] COMPETENT AND PROTECTED), ACCRUED RIGHTS MARRIED TO ①, ②, ③, ④, ⑤, ⑥, WOULD OPERATIONALLY EQUATE TO A JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT 'DECISION' (NOT TO SO 'OBSERVE' AND/OR 'APPLY' SUCH ACCRUED RIGHTS), AND WOULD VIOLATE THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]), OBLIGATIONS AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 1537, 1538, 1540, 1541, 1618. IBID] ([82. AND 83.]⁹), BECAUSE, [RETURN TO 1619.]
1628. THE CH. II JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT ([3.]), STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, IS ONLY JURISDICTIONALLY AUTHORISED TO ACTION ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, WITHIN THE STATUTORY BOUNDARIES OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT (S.A.) [85.],
1629. SO THEN, WHILST IT ACTIONS ITS TASKING AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBID], THE STATE (GOVERNMENT) OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA ~~MUST~~ MUST NOT FACILITATE ANY ACT/ACTION THAT IS INTENDED TO, OR DOES (IN FACT), IMPAIR/INTERFERE WITH THE SUBORDINATE ENFORCEMENT OF SAID LIFER'S

1630. 'IMPOSED SENTENCE', SUCH AS TO 'INCREASE MAXIMUM PERIOD OF PAROLE TO MORE THAN
 1631. TEN YEARS' (③, ⑤, ⑥), SUCH AS TO 'INCREASE THE EFFECTIVE 'NPP OF TIME' TO
 1632. LONGER THAN RESPECTIVE LIFERS' COURT IMPOSED 'NPP OF TIME' (③, ②, ①), SUCH AS
 TO 'NEGATE/INVALIDATE/STEAL RESPECTIVE LIFERS' END OF SENTENCE SATISFACTION
 RIGHT' (③, ⑤, ⑥))

THEREFORE, [RETURN TO 1607.]

1633. AS ABOVE DESCRIBED, NO MATTER WHAT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY/COMPETENCE THE STATE
 OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA BELIEVES IT HOLDS 'OPEN' TO IT, AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE
 ENFORCER', UPON A SENTENCED LIFER, SUCH AS ME [74.], OR ANOTHER SUCH LIFER
 WHO IS (ALREADY), OR IS NOT YET (BUT ERRONEOUSLY SHOULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN BY
 A COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT), SENTENCED 'ACCORDING TO/PURSUANT TO SENTENCING
 STANDARDS WHICH NO LONGER EXIST IN CURRENT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT' [85.],

1634. AND, QUITE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERS IN OPERATIONAL OBLIGATORY APPLICATION (OF SUCH

1635. 'DIFFERING SENTENCING STANDARDS'), SUCH AS MY 2002 JUDGMENT ORDERING ([74.]),
 THAT PRE-EXISTING SENTENCING STANDARDS "MUST" ([80.]), BE APPLIED,
 OBSERVED AND ENFORCED BY THE COMPETENT 'ENFORCER' OF MY 'IMPOSED SENTENCE' (BEING
 THE SA. GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), [SEE TEXT AT 1540. IBID]), FURTHERING SUCH
 ORDER BY DISTINGUISHING THAT "CURRENT" ([78.]), SENTENCING STANDARDS ARE NOT

1636. ONLY 'NOT APPLICABLE TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTY OF MY IMPOSED
 SENTENCE [74.]', THEY (THE 'CURRENT', BEING THE 2002 OPERATIONAL VERSION

1637. OF [46.]), 'ARE INVALID AND ~~ARE~~ EFFECTIVELY DO NOT EXIST TO CAUSE ANY
 JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT OBSTACLE, TO THE FULL AND COMPLIANT
 ENFORCEMENT OF MY 2002 SENTENCE ORDERS [74.], OF THE COMPETENT COURT
 [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 1537, 1538, 1539, 1540, 1541. IBID]',

1638. THE SA GOVERNMENT MUST ONLY 'ENFORCE' [SEE TEXT AT 1540. IBID], TERM OF
 INCARCERATION WHICH IS EITHER EQUAL TO, OR LESS THAN THAT ORDERED UPON

1639. ME IN 2002 (PER [74.]), BY THE COMPETENT COURT, BUT, IT HAS NO POWER,
 JURISDICTION, COMPETENCE OR AUTHORITY TO CREATE/EFFECT MORE PRISON TIME OR
 PAROLE TIME THAN THE COURT INCORPORATED WITHIN MY IMPOSED SENTENCE [74.],
 CONSISTENT WITH [TEXT AT 846, 847, 1515 TO 1519, 1520 TO ~~1521~~ 1526, 1527-1528. IBID],

1640. SO THAT,⁶ NO MATTER HOW MANY STATUTE AMENDMENTS OCCUR BETWEEN DATE OF CRIME (CONVICTED OF), AND DATE OF SENTENCING OF RESPECTIVE INDIVIDUAL CONVICTED PERSON, PROVIDING THAT THE SENTENCING COURT ITSELF IS COMPETENT, THEN, THE IMPOSED SENTENCE FROM THE SENTENCING COURT IS UNTOUCHABLE (AS FOR ITS LENGTH OF IMPOSED PENALTY OF SENTENCE DURATION, AND,⁶ SUPPORTIVE STATUTE AND COMMON LAW, TO ENSURE APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE, WITH THE COURT'S SENTENCING ORDERS, IS PART OF THE AUTHORITY OF DUE PROCESS WHICH MUST BE GENUINELY ACCEPTED BY SA GOVERNMENT' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847. IBID]), FROM AND/OR BY ANY CH. II [3.], SA GOVERNMENT PERSON/AGENCY/DEPARTMENT, AND
1641. THEREFORE, CANNOT BE LAWFULLY INCREASED PER ANY PRACTICAL MATTER OR MANNER OF BUSINESS (OF THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, INCORPORATING PARLIAMENT (CH. I [3.]), STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.])), OF OR BY STATE GOVERNMENT (DIRECTLY), AS ONLY A COMPETENT COURT CAN MAKE A NEW AND INCREASED SENTENCE PENALTY (DIRECTLY), WHICH THEN BECOMES A NEW SENTENCE ([38. AND 40.])⁹,
1642. HOWEVER, EVEN IF A NEW 'NPP' WAS CREATED AND IMPOSED BY SUCH COMPETENT RESENTENCING COURT (AS MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], WAS FOR ME [75. ("AFRESH")]),
1643. WHEREIN, PRE-EXISTING SENTENCING STANDARDS WERE RE-IMPOSED BY SUCH A RE-SENTENCING COURT, BY CLEAR ABROGATION OF 'CURRENT' (AT TIME OF RE-SENTENCING HEARING/DELIVERY OF NEW IMPOSED SENTENCE), AND IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY DCS ACT [85.], CHANGES TO 'MAXIMUM PAROLE LENGTH' ([151. AND 172.]), OR OTHER 'PAROLE APPLICATION/PROCESSING PROCEDURES', RELATING TO AND/OR
1644. AFFECTING, 'SENTENCING STANDARDS', THE SENTENCING 'ORDERS' OF THE COURT [SEE TEXT AT 1541. IBID], MUST BE 'ENFORCED' BY THE GOVERNMENT IN POWER (TO GOVERN THE STATE [SEE TEXT AT 1540. IBID]), AS THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HOLDS NO COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY TO REFUSE TO SUBORDINATELY COMPLY (WITH SUCH COURT'S SENTENCING ORDERS [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 1611 TO 1617 (INCLUSIVE), 1633 TO 1637. (INCLUSIVE), IBID])⁹,
1645. LOCATED, [RETURN TO 1603.]
1646. ONLY WITHIN A COMPETENT COURT (EXISTING ONLY IN CH. III [3.]), WHICH JURISDICTIONALLY ALSO PROHIBITS THE SA GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), FROM EFFECTING

ANY FORM OF 'SENTENCE IMPOSITION', WHICH EXCEEDS THE SENTENCE PENALTIES
 { MAXIMUM SENTENCE FOR MURDER CONVICTION ('LIFE'), MINIMUM SENTENCE FOR MURDER
 CONVICTION ('NPP') }, CREATED AND IMPOSED SOLELY BY COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT
 (WHICH FOR ME WAS THE FULL COURT, IN 2002, WHICH CREATED, DELIVERED, AND WITHIN
 DELIVERY WAS THE IMPOSING JUDGMENT [74.]),

1647. AS TO PENALTY IN CUSTODY (IN A PRISON ENVIRONMENT/FACILITY, INTRINSICALLY
 ASSOCIATED WITH COURT IMPOSED 'NPP' ('NPP DATE', 'NPP OF TIME')),

1648. AS TO PENALTY OF PAROLE LENGTH MAXIMUM (RE '1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS' [74., 77.,
 78., 79. AND 80.], [SEE TEXT AT 1614, 1616, 1617. IBID]),

1649. AS TO PENALTY OF TOTAL IMPOSED SENTENCE (RE '1992 SENTENCING
 STANDARDS' [74.], AS A DISTINCT AND FINITE PERIOD OF TIME, WHICH, CONSISTENT

1650. WITH MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], 'CALCULATES TO A FIXED AND FINITE 'NPP DATE'

1651. OF APPROXIMATELY LATE 2009', AND, 'CALCULATES TO A FIXED AND FINITE

1652. TOTAL IMPOSED SENTENCE OF APPROXIMATELY LATE 2019', AT WHICH 'MY WHOLE

SENTENCE (PER. PROPER AND MANDATORY OBSERVANCE, APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT
 OF COMPETENT COURT'S IMPOSED SUBSTANTIVE ('ACCRUED'), RIGHTS (SPOKEN-WORD
 QUALIFIED PROOF OF EXISTENCE OF 'SAME')), "WILL, SUBJECT TO THIS PART, BE TAKEN TO

HAVE BEEN WHOLLY SATISFIED." [SEE TEXT AT 1616. IBID], AS PER THE 'POSITIVE,
 AFFIRMATIVE, CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS AND UNMISTAKABLE' ([64.]), WORDING FORMING MY
 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], [SEE TEXT AT 938 TO 941, 1612 TO 1618, 1643 TO 1644. IBID]).

1653. I THINK THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE
ENFORCER', HAS EITHER 'FORGOTTEN HOW TO HONESTLY AND LAWFULLY ENFORCE A

1654. LIFER'S SENTENCE' (SUCH AS THAT IMPOSED UPON ME IN 2002 [74.], TO PRE-
 EXISTING (1992), SENTENCING STANDARDS, WHICH, PER THEIR APPLICATION (1992

SENTENCING STANDARDS), EFFECTIVELY, PRACTICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY MEANT THAT

1655. MY 'PENALTY OF TOTAL IMPOSED SENTENCE' [SEE TEXT AT 1649. IBID], WAS NOT

1656. 'THE POINT OF MY EVENTUAL DEATH' (AS THE REPRESENTATION EQUALLING THE
 MANDATORY HEAD-SENTENCE IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, PER STATUTE, OF "LIFE", SEE

1657. PARAGRAPH 55, IN 1999 HCA JUDGMENT [50.], "THE MANDATORY SENTENCE OF LIFE
 IMPRISONMENT IS THE SUCCESSOR TO THE MANDATORY SENTENCE OF DEATH 57."), IT WAS

1658. HOWEVER, A MEASURED AND CALCULATED PERIOD OF TIME, WITH A REAL START-DATE
 AND A REAL END-DATE, THAT ALSO MANDATED THAT MY ENTIRE IMPOSED SENTENCE
 IN 2002 ([74.]), WOULD BE FINISHED, 'WHOLLY SATISFIED', ONCE THE 'SET
 EFFECTS' HAD BEEN 'DETERMINED', 'CALCULATED', 'ANCHORED TO ACTUAL DATES',
 1659. 'REACHED', THEN 'OBSERVED AND APPLIED AND SATISFIED', AS CHARACTERISTICALLY DESCRIBED
 1660. IN PARAGRAPH 62. IN 1999 HCA JUDGMENT [50.], "... WHILST IT IS TRUE THAT
 PARLIAMENT IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA HAS REQUIRED THAT, IN ALL CASES INVOLVING A
 CONVICTION OF MURDER, A SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT MUST BE PASSED ON THE
 PRISONER, THAT REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE READ IN ISOLATION. IT EXISTS WITHIN
 A MATRIX OF LEGISLATION. IN MORE RECENT TIMES SUCH LEGISLATION HAS IMPOSED
 UPON ~~THE~~ JUDGES THE FURTHER DUTY, WHERE APPROPRIATE, TO FIX A NON-PAROLE
 PERIOD IN SUCH CASES ^{77.}. SUCH AN ORDER CONTEMPLATES THAT THE NON-~~THE~~
 PAROLE PERIOD WILL USUALLY BE FOLLOWED BY RELEASE OF THE LIFE PRISONER ON
 1661. PAROLE. THAT STEP, IN TURN, IF THE CONDITIONS OF PAROLE ARE OBSERVED, CONTEMPLATES
 THE PROSPECT THAT AFTER NO MORE THAN TEN YEARS NOR LESS THAN THREE YEARS ON
 PAROLE, THE PRISONER'S SENTENCE, ALTHOUGH ORIGINALLY ONE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT,
 1662. WILL BE WHOLLY SATISFIED ^{78.} ", FOLLOWED BY PARAGRAPH 63. IN 1999 HCA
 JUDGMENT [50.], "THUS, IN THE SCHEME OF THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION,
 LIFE IMPRISONMENT DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN (AND IN MOST CASES WILL NOT INVOLVE),
 IMPRISONMENT FOR THE TERM OF THE PRISONER'S NATURAL LIFE ^{79.} ",
 AND,

1663. THE PARTICULAR 'SET EFFECTS' AS ABOVE INDICATED, WHICH SPECIFICALLY ANCHOR TO
 AND ARE INTRINSIC TO 'MY TRUE IMPOSED SENTENCE' ([74.]), ARE DESCRIBED AT
 [TEXT 1612, 1613, 1614, 1615, 1616, 1617, 1618, 1627. IBID]), AND THEREFORE DON'T FULLY
 1664. APPRECIATE AND ACKNOWLEDGE, THAT WHILST DEBATING (IN PARLIAMENT), BILL PROPOSALS
 FOR NEW AND/OR AMENDED STATUTE, 'THERE SHOULD BE INCLUSIVE PROVISIONS WITHIN
 SUCH BILL PROPOSALS, WHEN DEBATING MATTERS RELATING PARTICULARLY TO CORRECTIONS
STATUTE ([85.]), CRIMINAL LAW SENTENCING STATUTE ([34. AND 45.]), AND CLCA
([31.]), WHERE POINTS IN ISSUE, AFFECT (OR MAY AFFECT, OR COULD INADVERTANTLY
AFFECT), 'SUBSTANTIVE / ACCRUED RIGHTS', OWNED BY PERSONS WHO MAY BECOME THE

1665. STATE'S TARGET OF SUCH STATUTE PROPOSALS, SO THAT, RESPECTIVE OWNERS OF SUCH
1666. 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS', ARE PROPERLY/PROCEDURALLY AFFORDED (NOT JUST
BY THEIR ACQUIRED CONSTITUTIONAL (CL.1), RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO LAW,
BUT ALSO, VIA STRICT AND POSITIVE WORDING WITHIN SUCH NEW/AMENDED STATUTE⁹,
THEIR LEGITIMATE AND LEGAL RIGHT TO ARGUE, DEFEND AND HAVE JUDICIALLY RE-IMPOSED
(TO OBSERVE AND PRACTICALLY APPLY), THEIR RESPECTIVE SAID 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED
1667. RIGHTS' (AN EXAMPLE OF SUCH SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS RE-IMPOSED BY JURISDICTIONALLY
COMPETENT BODY, WHERE ACCRUED RIGHTS, PER ACTUAL JUDGMENT PROPER, WERE
ACCEPTED BY THE COURT AS ARGUED, DEFENDED AND PROTECTED IN AND BY A
CH. III (E3.1), COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, WOULD BE, WITHIN MY 2002
JUDGMENT [74.], INCLUDING AND IDENTIFIED AS/AT [77., 78. AND 80.]),
1668. SO THAT ANY SUCH 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS', WHICH IN FACT SHOULD ALREADY
1669. BE ACCOMMODATED (WITHIN STATUTE CHANGES, EXCEPT, AS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THIS
DOCUMENT, THE STATE GOVERNMENT HAS SUBMITTED, IN PARLIAMENT, AND ARGUED, FALSE
AND DEFECTIVE DOCUMENTS (WRITTEN EXPRESSIONS OF AMENDMENT PROPOSALS), CLAIMING
'RIGHT' OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, TO VOID CERTAIN SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OWNED BY
CERTAIN LIFER-PRISONERS, EXAMPLE, LIFER'S SENTENCED PRIOR TO 1-8-1994 TO THE
SENTENCING STANDARDS OF THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' [139.], AND ACCRUED
RIGHTS (OWNER BY LIFER), THEREIN IMPOSED, THEN, IMPROPERLY AND BY ULTRA
VIRE MEANS, STOLEN BY PARLIAMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENT [52. AND 53.], SO
THAT THEIR 'IMPOSED PENDING-~~THE~~ FINITE SENTENCE LENGTH' (TO 'NPP DATE'), AND
'PENDING-FINITE TOTAL SENTENCE' (UNTIL 'WHOLLY SATISFIED' [SEE TEXT AT 1649. TO
1652. (INCLUSIVE), IBID]), WAS NO LONGER THEIR ENFORCED SENTENCE (BY STATE
GOVERNMENT), AS THEIR RESPECTIVE SENTENCES WERE THEREFROM 'IMPOSED BY
SA PARLIAMENT, AND UNLAWFULLY MAINTAINED GOVERNANCE OF BY SA GOVERNMENT⁹,
PROCEDURALLY, ADMINISTRATIVELY AND PRACTICALLY (THE PHYSICAL, OPERATIONAL
ACTION OF ACTUALLY DOING), THEREBY OBSERVED AND APPLIED, IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY
1670. STATUTE AMENDMENTS/CREATIONS, ARE, PROVIDED FOR VIA INCLUSIVE WORDING
WITHIN SUCH NEW STATUTE (CREATIONS/AMENDMENTS), SO THAT THEIR RIGHT OF
APPLICATION (OF THEIR IMPOSED ACCRUED SENTENCING RIGHTS), IS NOT STOLEN

ABUSIVELY BY ARBITRARY EFFECT, OF JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT OPERATION, OF ERRONEOUSLY INDISCRIMINATE STATUTE (CONSEQUENTIAL TO ANY FALSE AND/OR FRAUDULENT BELIEF OF SA PARLIAMENT, DURING VOTING OVER SUCH STATUTE CHANGES, CAUSING UNCONSTITUTIONAL EFFECT [1, 82. AND 83.], WITHOUT ANY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT ([1.]), TO SO EFFECT),

1671. SIMILAR, AS A REFERENCE 'ERRONEOUS AND INDISCRIMINATE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE CHANGE', TO THE STATEMENT OF SA ATTORNEY-GENERAL, WHEN EXPLAINING '1994 SENTENCING STANDARDS', PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, TO PARLIAMENT ([52.], [53.], [64. (PARA. 117.

1672. "ARBITRY")], [139.], AND [137.]), AS DETAILED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, ~~THE~~ 'THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT JURISDICTION ([1.]), TO DETERMINE IF SUCH LIFERS MUST RECEIVE THE TRUE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF REMISSIONS SYSTEM CALCULATION [126.], AND/OR EFFECT OF AUTOMATIC PAROLE [207. (PARA. 20.)], IS A CH. III ([3.]), COMPETENT COURT', NEVER, SA PARLIAMENT,

1673. AS SUBSTANTIATED, WITHIN MY 2002 JUDGMENT PROPER [74.], IN PARTICULAR, AT [75., 77., 78., 79, AND 80.], THE COURT ORDERED AND THE GOVERNMENT (OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA), MUST COMPLY [SEE TEXT AT 847 AND 846. IBID], AND APPLY [SEE TEXT AT 1647. TO 1652. (INCLUSIVE), IBID],

OR, [RETURN TO 1654.]

1674. FLIPPANTLY DISREGARDS 'ITS' CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]), OBLIGATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, WHILE GOVERNING THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, AND ACTIONING THE ENFORCEMENT OF COURT'S COMPETENTLY IMPOSED SENTENCE,

1675. TOWARDS RESPECTIVE 'SENTENCED LIFER'S TERM OF INCARCERATION, TERM OF PERMITTED PAROLE LENGTH, TERM OF TOTAL SENTENCE LENGTH, AND, DESIGNATION POINT

1676. OF SENTENCE SATISFACTION', AND IN SO ACTING, 'PUSHES JURISDICTIONAL

1677. RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS, OUT OF SIGHT', THEN, 'FRAUDULENTLY CAUSES UNLAWFULLY CREATED DETRIMENT AND HARM, TO RESPECTIVE LIFERS, INCLUDING TO ME,

1678. AS I HAVE DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT (SUCH AS ARBITRARY 'THEFT' OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' EFFECTS, TO ALREADY SENTENCED LIFERS' TERM OF CUSTODY, TERM OF PAROLE LENGTH, AND, TERM OF TOTAL SENTENCE LENGTH, AND, 'FAKE SENTENCES'),

1679. AND, BY FRAUDULENT/DEFECTIVE/ULTRA VIRES USE (ABUSE), OF CH. I AND II [3.] AUTHORITY, TO IMPROPERLY CREATE A CIRCUMSTANCE OF (EFFECTIVELY), A CRIMINALLY-MISREPRESENTATIVELY APPLIED AND CONTROLLED STATE GOVERNMENT'S SENTENCE, RATHER THAN ONLY A CRIMINAL SENTENCING COURT'S SENTENCE, AND IN SO DOING, 1680. ULTIMATELY DEFECTING THEIR COMPETENT AUTHORITY AND REPLACING IT WITH FALSE AUTHORITY, FALSE JURISDICTION, FALSE COMPETENCE, AND A BLATANT REJECTION OF ALL CLAIMS THAT THEIR SAID ACTIONS ARE ILLEGAL, FRAUDULENT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL [1.] (WITHOUT EVEN SEEKING A COURT'S RULING OVER MY STATED ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THEM... WHICH INVITES A CURIOUS POINT... IF I AM WRONG (AS THE SA GOVERNMENT REPEATEDLY CLAIMS), THEN WHY IS THE SA GOVERNMENT NOT SEEKING COURTS JUDGMENT TO SUPPORT THEIR STATED POSITION 219.

1683. DUE TO THE FALSE-BELIEFS OF THE SA PARLIAMENT AND SA GOVERNMENT, AND SA SUPREME COURTS, AND SA FULL COURTS, AND THE HIGH COURT IN LGE [50.], IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CLARIFY REMARKS IN PARAGRAPH 56. IN 1999 HCA JUDGMENT [50.], WHEREIN, IT APPEARS THE BENCH OF THE HIGH COURT, IN ITS SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE THEN CURRENT (1999), SOUTH AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING STANDARDS, THAT, 'IT' (THE HCA), IS STATING AN ABSOLUTE AND COMPETENT AND CONSTITUTIONALLY (C1.2), COMPETENT FACT, WHEN DESCRIBING THE 'AUTHORITY TO ORDER RELEASE OF A LIFER ON PAROLE, NO LONGER WITH BOARD, BUT BACK TO GOVERNOR, AND AS SUCH THE GOVERNOR HOLDS ABSOLUTE VETO OVER BOARD, MARRYING TO FORMERLY TERMED 'GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE' ([204. (PARA. 83, 84.1)],

1685. THE BENCH (IF THAT IS WHAT THEY ACTUALLY THOUGHT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY COMPETENT [1.]), HOWEVER, THEN THEY WOULD BE WRONG), IS ONLY DESCRIBING WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS

1686. IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, REGARDING 'WHAT ROLE PAROLE BOARD PLAYS, WHAT JURISDICTION PAROLE BOARD CLAIMS TO HOLD, WHAT ROLE GOVERNOR [29.] PLAYS, WHAT JURISDICTION GOVERNOR CLAIMS TO HOLD, WHAT ROLE AND AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION AND POWER 1688. THE SA GOVERNMENT (CABINET), CLAIMS TO OWN AND HOLD, WHICH, WHEN COMPARED 1689.

1690. TO WHAT IS ACTUALLY ALLOWED TO HAPPEN (AS DISTINCTLY DIFFERENT, AND THEREFORE DISTINGUISHED FROM, SAID TWO POSITIONS OF ASSESSMENT ('WHAT IS ALLOWED TO HAPPEN'; 'WHAT DOES ACTUALLY HAPPEN')), WOULD CAUSE GREAT CONCERN TO THE HCA, I SUSPECT, AND, I DON'T THINK SUCH A COURT WOULD DEFLECT SUCH CONCERN EITHER... I THINK SUCH A COURT MIGHT EVEN PROMPT (OR POSSIBLY INITIATE THEIR OWN), 'A CONSTITUTION ([1.]), COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT AGAINST SAID HAPPENINGS ([SEE TEXT AT 1685 TO 1688 (INCLUSIVE), IBID])'.

1691. THE HCA IN SAID MATTER [50.], MADE IT CLEAR THEREIN, THAT "THE PARTICULAR QUESTION WHICH ARISES IN THE PRESENT CASE IS WHETHER, IN A DETERMINATION OF THE LENGTH OF A NON-PAROLE PERIOD IN A CASE OF A RELATIVELY YOUNG OFFENDER, HIS YOUTH COUNTS

1692. AGAINST HIM." [50. (PARA. 1.)]. 'THAT', DOES NOT REQUIRE THE HCA TO INVESTIGATE THE CONSTRUCTION LEGALITY/COMPETENCE, OF THE RELEVANT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK, OF SOUTH AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING STANDARDS, WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]),

1693. COMPETENCIES ([1., 6., 7., 11., 16., 17., 27., 28., 64., 82. AND 83.]), AND SO, WHAT THE BENCH WAS STATING WITHIN SAID PARAGRAPH 56. IN 1999 HCA JUDGMENT [50.], ONLY REPRESENTED (WITHIN THE TARGET TEXT OF SAID PARAGRAPH), WHAT THE 'SA GOVERNMENT' WAS 'PROCEDURALLY' ACTIONING OVER DECADES, AND RELEVANT STATUTE

1694. ~~WAS~~ ASSOCIATED WITH SAID 'PROCEDURAL ACTIONS', BUT DID NOT APPROACH ANY QUESTION OF JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF ANY OF SAID 'PROCEDURAL ACTIONS'.

1695. THE TARGET TEXT WITHIN SAID PARAGRAPH 56. IN [50.], IS :

1696. "... THE EARLIER POWER OF THE PAROLE BOARD 58. TO RELEASE A LIFE PRISONER SHORT OF THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD FIXED BY A JUDGE HAS BEEN ABOLISHED. 59.

1697. REMISSIONS HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED 60.

1698. THEY NO LONGER APPLY TO REDUCE THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD FIXED BY THE COURT.

1699. ON THE EXPIRY OF THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD FIXED, THERE IS NO LONGER AN AUTOMATIC RELEASE ON PAROLE.

1700. WITH RESPECT TO LIFE PRISONERS, THE PAROLE BOARD NOW HAS NO AUTHORITY ITSELF TO ORDER RELEASE OF THE PRISONER.

1701. THAT IS RESERVED, ONCE AGAIN, TO THE GOVERNOR WHO WOULD ACT ON THE

ADVICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ^{61.}

1702. THE APPLICABLE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, THEREFORE, TENDS TO REINFORCE ~~THE~~ THE IMPORTANCE OF THE JUDICIAL NON-PAROLE ORDER."
1703. THIS DOCUMENT SERVES AS A 'CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]) COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL', BY WHICH THE 'TARGET TEXT' MAY BE MEASURED, FROM WHAT WAS DONE PER RELEVANT STATUTE [SEE TEXT AT 1696 TO 1702. (INCLUSIVE), IBID], TO WHAT WAS PERMITTED TO BE DONE (DESCRIBED THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT), BUT WHICH WAS NOT 'PRACTICALLY' RESTRICTED TO BY OPERATIONAL ACTIONS OF/BY THE SA GOVERNMENT (WHILST ACTING AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER'), HENCE JURISDICTIONAL FRAUD ([83.]).
1704. EVEN THOUGH "REMISSIONS" HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM STATUTE [SEE TEXT AT 1697. IBID.], THEIR 'OPERATIONAL EFFECT' HAD TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR [137.], AS THEY WERE PROTECTED 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS', OWNED BY RESPECTIVE 'PRISONERS', WHICH INCLUDED LIFERS, BORNE FROM STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION [123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, AND 207. (PARAGRAPH, 20. OF JUDGMENT PROPER)], AND WERE MARRIED TO THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE-RELEASE' (INCLUDING FOR LIFERS), [139.].
1705. THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE-RELEASE', WAS A 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHT', WHICH WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]), PROTECTED UNTIL FULL SATISFACTION OF SUCH SENTENCE TO WHICH THEY WERE APPLIED (INCLUDING OPERATIONAL EFFECT DESCRIBED AT [128.]), WHICH ALSO PROTECTED SAID 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE EFFECTS' FROM PROCEDURAL CHANGES, WHICH EFFECTIVELY CREATED A 'SENTENCE PENALTY GREATER THAN THAT IMPOSED BY RESPECTIVE SENTENCING COURT' (IRRESPECTIVE OF YEAR OF SENTENCE BEING DELIVERED AND IMPOSED [74, 75, 79, 77, 78. AND 80.]), AND THEREFORE WAS PROHIBITED FROM BEING CLASSIFIED AND TREATED AS MERELY PROCEDURAL IN FORM AND CHARACTER (SO THAT [27.], WAS NEGATED/INVALIDATED, WITH RESPECT TO MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], BY THE
1706. COURT'S DIRECTIONS AT [79, 80, 78. AND 77.]), WHICH, AS ELABORATED ON IN PINDER [208.], 'PROCEDURES' WHICH DISSECT, IMPEDE, VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS, ARE NOT MERELY PROCEDURAL IN NATURE, AND THEREFORE MUST NOT VETO (OR EVEN ATTEMPT TO VETO), SUCH SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS FROM PROGRESSING THEIR INTENDED OPERATIONAL EFFECT, AS IMPOSED BY RESPECTIVE SENTENCING COURT (SUCH AS MY 2002 COURT [74.]), [SEE TEXT AT 1122 TO 1155. (INCLUSIVE), IBID].

1707. AS ALREADY DESCRIBED ABOVE (PART. 10, HEREIN), WHEN I WAS RESENTENCED
 IN 2002 [74.], THE COMPETENT COURT IMPOSED UPON ME A SENTENCE, WHICH WAS
 TO BE ENFORCED BY SA GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.], 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER'),
 'PURSUANT TO', 'IN ACCORDANCE WITH', AND, 'GOVERNED BY' "1992" ([78., 79. AND
 1708. 80.]), 'SENTENCING STANDARDS', AND, INTRINSIC TO SUCH COURT'S ORDER, WAS
 THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' [SEE TEXT AT 1704. IBID],
 1709. WHICH (AS INDICATED [AT TEXT 1612 TO 1618 (INCLUSIVE)]), FUNDAMENTALLY RANGED
SPECIFIC PERIODS OF TIME ANCHORING TO SPECIFIC EVENTS OF AND WITHIN MY SENTENCE,
 SUCH AS 'CALCULATED DATE OF NPP', 'WHEN I COULD (THEREFORE), APPLY FOR PAROLE-RELEASE',
 THE 'PROCEDURAL STIPULATIONS JURISDICTIONALLY OPEN TO SA GOVERNMENT (CONSEQUENTIAL
 TO [38., 40., 45. AND 80.], AND FOLLOWING MY PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION BEING
 SUBMITTED)', 'CALCULATED DATES BETWEEN WHICH MY PAROLE-RELEASE MUST START [126.]',
 AND 'CALCULATED DATES BETWEEN WHICH MY PAROLE MAXIMUM LENGTH MUST END', AND,
 'CALCULATED DATES BETWEEN WHICH MY IMPOSED SENTENCE MUST ENFORCEABLY BE
 1710. FULLY SATISFIED [SEE TEXT AT 1257. TO 1261. (INCLUSIVE), IBID]'. BASICALLY, WHEN
 I, OR ANY OTHER LIFER IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, AND REALLY, EVERY SA PERSON WHO IS
 1711. (CRIMINAL JURISDICTION), SENTENCED, 'THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS FOR FUTURE
 1712. APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF', SO, FOR A LIFER, THE IMPOSED SENTENCE WHICH
 SA. GOVERNMENT MUST ENFORCE, IS FOR 'THAT DAY ONWARDS', AND THE NEXT DAY,
 AND THE NEXT DAY, AND THE NEXT DAY, AND THE NEXT DAY, AND SO ON, AND SO ON, AND
 SO ON, UNTIL, THE SENTENCE IS FULLY SATISFIED, WHICH, FOR ME, WAS ABLE TO
 BE CALCULATED PURSUANT TO THE SPECIFIC SENTENCE CHARACTERISTICS IMPOSED
 ON ME (BY SAID 2002 RE-SENTENCING EVENT, AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE SPECIFICALLY
 WORDED JUDGMENT [74.]), FORMING THE FOUNDATION OF THE ORDERS OF
 1713. THE COURT [45., 78., 79., 80. AND 77.]. IT IS SIGNIFICANT AND FUNDAMENTAL
 1714. TO THE ENFORCEABLE SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON ME ([74.]), IN 2002, THAT I WAS
NOT SENTENCED TO 'GOVERNOR'S OR GOVERNMENT'S PLEASURE' [SEE TEXT AT 1684. IBID],
 1715. I WAS NOT SENTENCED TO 'SA PAROLE BOARD'S PLEASURE/DISCRETION (WHEREBY BOARD
TREATS THEIR PURPORTED AUTHORITY, AS IF THEY HOLD JURISDICTION TO 'DENY' ME
PAROLE-RELEASE ON THEIR OWN DETERMINATION)' [107., 108. AND 194. (PARAS. 16, 21.)],

1716. I WAS NOT SENTENCED TO ANY CIRCUMSTANCE WHEREBY A PERIOD OF PAROLE, COULD IN ANY CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.3]), COMPETENT WAY BE ORDERED AGAINST ME, WHICH WAS 'OPEN-ENDED', 'FOR THE TERM OF MY NATURAL LIFE', 'WHICH EXCEEDED 10 YEARS' (NOT BY ANY SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENTARY (CH.I [3.1]), OR STATE GOVERNMENT (CH.II [3.1]), ACTION, DECISION, STATUTE AMENDMENT OR CONDUCT ([82. AND 83.1])), AS MY IMPOSED SENTENCE ACTUALLY INCORPORATED A STATUTORY MAXIMUM PAROLE PERIOD OF 10 YEARS (AND MINIMUM OF 3 YEARS), [SEE TEXT AT 1257. TO 1261, 1612. TO 1618, INCLUSIVE, IBID], AND, AS THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (EXISTING ONLY WITHIN CH.II [3.1]), WHILST PERFORMING THE TASK AND FUNCTION OF THE LAWFULLY AUTHORISED 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' [SEE TEXT AT 870. IBID], ONLY HOLDS JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO ENFORCE THE SENTENCE IMPOSED [SEE
1718. TEXT AT 1537. TO 1541. (INCLUSIVE), IBID], BUT, IS NOT IN ANY WAY PERMITTED TO CREATE AND THEN IMPOSE ANY 'PENALTY OF SENTENCE TIME/TYPE' GREATER THAN IMPOSED
1719. SENTENCE [74.], 'THE SENTENCE', CANNOT BE INCREASED BY ANY EVENT, MANNER OR THING, OTHER THAN A 'JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT COURT', SPECIFICALLY HEARING AND DEALING WITH MY ALREADY IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND,
1720. SUCH A COURT CAN ONLY EXIST IN 'CRIMINAL LAW JURISDICTION', AND, 'BOTH' SAID COURT AND JURISDICTION EXIST ONLY WITHIN (RELEVANT TO SENTENCING HEARING), CH.III
1721. [3.], THEREFORE, THE FACT OF RE-IMPOSITION OF 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS IN ~~2002~~ 2002 [74., 78., 80. AND 77.], RE-ESTABLISHES MY SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS TO THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT, OF 'AUTOMATIC-PAROLE ACT' FEATURES REGARDING MATTERS DESCRIBED AT [TEXT 1612. TO 1618. IBID], UNTIL THE COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE IS FULLY SATISFIED [SEE TEXT AT 1616, 1617, 1618. IBID],
- THEREFORE, [RETURN TO 1704 AND 1705.]
1722. CONSEQUENTIAL TO [80.], 'INTRINSIC TO [74.]', AND, IT IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT THAT THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT 'HAS NOT COURT-CHALLENGED SAID JUDGMENT [74.]'
1723. (AS AT SEPTEMBER 2017.), THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF [78., 80. AND 77.], MUST BE OBSERVED AND APPLIED TO THEIR '1992 STATUTORY EFFECT', THEREBY REALISING MY PROPER SENTENCE PER 2002 COURT'S DETERMINATION '[74.]', [SEE TEXT AT 938.
1724. TO 941. (INCLUSIVE), IBID], EQUATING TO (APPROXIMATELY), 2009 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE

1725. RELEASE', AND, '2009 PLUS 10 YEARS ANCHORING TO APPROXIMATELY 2019' "WHOLLY"
SATISFIED SENTENCE [SEE TEXT AT 1612 TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE), IBID], [SEE TEXT AT 1257
TO 1261. (INCLUSIVE), IBID].

1726. AS ABOVE HIGHLIGHTED, WHEN MY ORIGINAL SENTENCE FOR MURDER (1994.), CROWN'S
APPEAL JUDGMENT [212.], AND MY PETITION APPEAL JUDGMENT [74.], WERE EACH
DELIVERED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]), OBLIGATION
MARRIED TO EACH RESPECTIVE JUDGMENT, IMPOSED UPON THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
BY SAID COMPETENT COURTS, ISN'T JUST THAT SAID IMPOSED SENTENCES MUST [30.
("SHALL")], BE OBSERVED, APPLIED AND ENFORCED [SEE TEXT AT 870. IBID], IT IS
ALSO A STATUTORY IMPOSITION (UPON THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA), THAT EVERY
INTENDED ACTION TO TRY TO INCREASE PENALTY OF IMPOSED SENTENCE (BY THE SOUTH
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (CH. II [3.]), MUST COMPLY WITH STATUTORY DUE
PROCESSES PER. COMPETENT PROCEDURAL LAWS, SUCH AS [45., 38. AND 40.], AND
1727. SO, WITHOUT ANY COMPETENT COURTS' (CH. III [3.]), JUDICIAL SENTENCE CHANGE
TO EXISTING IMPOSED SENTENCE [74.], ALL DAYS THEREAFTER MUST ALSO HOLD
TRUE AT THEIR ARRIVAL, THE SAME SENTENCING STANDARDS IMPOSED BY THE
COMPETENT COURT, AND OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF SAME TOO [SEE TEXT AT
1728. 1612. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE), IBID], BECAUSE, WHEN MY COMPETENT SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED,
IT CARRIED (WITH ~~■~~ ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY), WITHIN IT, 'SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT JURISDICTION
PROTECTION', AGAINST NON-ENFORCEMENT OF INTENDED AND INTENDING
1729. COMPLETION / SATISFACTION OF IMPOSED SENTENCE (SUCH AS IF S.A.
GOVERNMENT TRIED TO EXTEND / INCREASE, OR EVEN CREATE THEIR OWN 'NPP OF TIME',
TO THEN APPLY TO ME AND ENFORCE AGAINST ME (AS THEY HAVE ALREADY DONE), THEY
WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]), PROHIBITED FROM DOING SO, DUE TO PROCEDURAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE STIPULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS, OF, [45., 44., 38. AND 40.], AT
THE VERY LEAST, AND SUCH PROHIBITIONS EXIST THROUGH THE TERM OF MY
ENTIRE IMPOSED SENTENCE, INCLUDING 'THE TOMORROW DAY (DAYS OF
LEGITIMATE SENTENCE [74.], NOT YET REACHED), UNTIL THE INTENDED SENTENCE WHICH
WAS IMPOSED UPON ME IS WHOLLY SATISFIED TO ITS COMPLETION [SEE TEXT AT 1724,
1730. 1725. IBID]). FOR 'THESE' REASONS, MY ACCRUED / SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS ATTRACTED TO

- MY IMPOSED SENTENCE ([74.]), TOGETHER WITH ESTABLISHED AND ANCHORED SENTENCE FEATURES [SEE TEXT AT 1716. TO 1725 (INCLUSIVE), IBID], PROVE THAT [TEXT AT 1698. 1731. IBID], IS AN ~~INCOMPLETE~~ INCOMPLETE REMARK (IN ITS SIMPLE WORDING). THOUGH THE OPERATING RELEVANT STATUTE AT THAT TIME (1999), DID NOT CONTAIN 'REMISSIONS CALCULATION WORDING', THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT DID CONTINUE STILL (FOR EXAMPLE, [126.] CARRIED THROUGH (IN PART), AFTER 1-8-1994 ([46.]), SEE [52., 53., 137. AND 139.], SO THAT 'THE THIRD REDUCTION' CONTINUED AND THEREBY REDUCED 'LENGTH OF CALCULATED 'NPP OF TIME' ACCORDINGLY), WITH PRACTICAL ^{QUALIFICATION} ~~INCOMPLETE~~ EVIDENCED IN WATSON'S 2010 JUDGMENT, AT PARAGRAPH 31. [194. (PARA. 31.)], WHICH DESCRIBED THE ORIGINAL EXISTING 'NPP OF TIME' (PRE [46.]), AT APPROXIMATELY 24 YEARS, THEN, POST 1733. 1-8-1994 IT WAS 'ONE THIRD REDUCED' TO APPROXIMATELY 16. YEARS. IF COMPARING THE [TEXT AT 1698. IBID], DELIVERED BY SAID COURT IN 1999 ([50.]), TO THE ORDERS OF MY 2002 JUDGMENT ([74.]), PARTICULARLY [80., 78., 79. AND 77.], THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT THE APPLICABLE IMPOSED SENTENCING STANDARDS, WITHIN MY 2002 JUDGMENT, WERE THE "SENTENCING STANDARDS APPLICABLE IN 1992." [80.], 1734. WHICH EQUATES TO A CONTINUING OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF SAID 'REMISSIONS SENTENCING STANDARDS' AFTER 1-8-1994 ([46.]), PER. IMPOSED SENTENCE UPON RELEVANT 'LIFER', IRRESPECTIVE OF [46.] STIPULATIONS (RE 'REMISSIONS SYSTEM SENTENCES'), THEREBY PROVING ALSO, THAT MY COURT'S ORDERS [74.], ARE THE ONLY JURISDICTIONALLY COMPETENT ENTITY (CH. III [3.]), TO CREATE 1735. AND DETERMINE MY SENTENCE ORDERS, WHICH INCLUDES THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS 'REMISSIONS' CALCULATIONS (TOWARDS RELEVANT PERIODS OF TIME), AND 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE-RELEASE' (AT RESPECTIVE AND RELEVANT TIME), AND 'MAXIMUM PAROLE LENGTH OF 10. YEARS ENDING WITH FULL SATISFACTION OF SENTENCE IMPOSED' (SO THAT NO SENTENCE PORTION/PART IS LEFT TO SERVE-OUT, AFTER SAID MAXIMUM PAROLE DURATION OF 10. YEARS), 1736. WHICH SUPPORTS MY STATEMENT THAT 'THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS/ENTITLEMENTS (IMPOSED UPON ME IN 2002 [74.]), AS OPERATING IN THE 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS (SOUTH AUSTRALIA), PARTICULARLY THOSE FEATURES DESCRIBED AT [TEXT 1612. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE), IBID], DID CONTINUE, AS THEY

MUST CONTINUE, TO AFFECT MY IMPOSED SENTENCE, WELL AFTER 1994, AS QUALIFIED AT [78., 79., 80., 77. AND 74.], AND MUST SO AFFECT MY COMPETENT COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE (UPON ME, [74.]), UNTIL THE IMPOSED SENTENCE IS WHOLLY SATISFIED. [SEE TEXT AT 1614, 1615, 1616, 1617, 1618. IBID.]

1738. THE ORDERS OF MY 2002 COURT (WITHIN [74.]), MANDATED OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF '1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS' [80.], THEREBY INVALIDATING EXISTING SENTENCING STANDARDS ([46.]), FROM AFFECTING MY SUBSTANTIVE
1739. RIGHTS UNDER '1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS' (IN PARTICULAR, MY REINSTATED ACCRUED RIGHTS AS FEATURED IN ~~TEXT~~ [TEXT AT 1612. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE), IBID], AND, QUITE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE FACT OF OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE "AUTOMATIC
1740. PAROLE ACT", AS DESCRIBED IN ANDREWS [207.], THEREIN AT PARAGRAPH 15,
1741. "... ("THE AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT"), WAS IN OPERATION AT THE TIME... PURSUANT TO THAT SECTION, THE PLAINTIFF HAD THE RIGHT TO REMISSIONS AND TO BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED ON PAROLE, SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS, AT THE EXPIRATION OF THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD SET BY THE COURT. "],

SO THAT,

1742. ALTHOUGH, AS STATED AT [TEXT 1699. IBID], THE SA GOVERNMENT (ACTING AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER'), NO LONGER OPERATIONALLY RELEASED LIFERS (WHO WERE COMPETENTLY AND PROPERLY SENTENCED, ACCORDING AND PURSUANT TO THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SENTENCING STANDARDS [126. AND 139.]), 'AUTOMATICALLY' ([139.]), AS THE DCS ACT [85.], NO LONGER (SINCE 1-8-1994 [46.]), CONTAINED THE WORDING OF [126.],

1743. BY INVESTIGATING,
- THIS COMPLAINT DOCUMENT, AND CLAIMS BY ME HEREIN, THAT THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA WAS JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT, IN ITS DECISIONS AND ACTIONS, TO TAKE FROM ME (WITHOUT JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OR AUTHORITY [82. AND 83.]),
1744. THAT WHICH THE COURT ORDERED, NOT ONLY DOES IT QUALIFY THE COURT'S
1745. SENTENCING JURISDICTION IN MY JUDGMENT ([74. AND 80.]), AS ABOVE THE JURISDICTIONAL POWER OF THE SA GOVERNMENT (ONLY UP TO CH. II [3.], LIMIT),
1746. AND ABOVE THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND RESTRICTIONS OF [85.] (WHICH

IS RESTRICTED TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND HAS NO JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL LAW, AND SO CANNOT CREATE OR IMPOSE ANY 'CRIMINAL-LAW-TYPE' SENTENCE AGAINST ME, AS [85.] IS ONLY PERMITTED TO BE OPERATED/APPLIED BY SA GOVERNMENT, TO ENABLE COMPLIANT ENFORCEMENT OF THE COMPETENT COURTS CREATED AND

1747. IMPOSED SENTENCE [74.], [SEE TEXT AT 870. IBID.]], AND ABOVE THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

1748. (AS IS CLAIMED TO BE HELD BY THE COMBINED ACTIONS OF PARLIAMENT (CH. I [1. AND 3.]), AND STATE GOVERNMENT (CH. II [1. AND 3.]), TO FLIPPANTLY TAKE FROM A LIFERS' IMPOSED SENTENCE (THROUGH BILL PROPOSALS FOR STATUTE AMENDMENTS, REPEALS), THE IMPOSED (WITHIN COURTS' SENTENCE ORDERS), 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHT, OF THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT, OF THE AUTOMATIC PAROLE-RELEASE, PER. EFFECT OF APPLICATION OF [126.]', WHICH BY PARLIAMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND CONDUCT, SHIFTED (MOVED THE GOAL POST AFTER BALL WAS KICKED - AFTER SENTENCING), BY [52. AND 53.], TO [56. AND 57.], AND, ~~BE~~ HAVING DONE SO PRIOR TO SEEKING CONSTITUTIONAL CLEARANCE ([1.])', THEREFORE, ALSO, HAVING DONE SO WITHOUT CONSTITUTION JURISDICTION [1. AND 3.], TO WHAT

1749. THEREAFTER (AFTER 1-8-1994), EFFECTIVELY, BECAME A RE-SENTENCING OF SUCH LIFERS BY SA GOVERNMENT 'AGENTS', AND IN DOING SO THEY ALSO, ON A MASS SCALE, STOLE FROM MANY EXISTING LIFERS, THEIR SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO HAVE ONLY THEIR (RESPECTIVE), COMPETENT COURTS' IMPOSED SENTENCES CARRIED-OUT/ENFORCED AGAINST THEM (AND ME), [SEE TEXT AT 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27. TO 32. (INCLUSIVE), 34. TO 37. (INCLUSIVE), IBID.]],

SO THEN, [RETURN TO 1744.]

1750. WITH THE ESTABLISHED JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE ANCHORED ONLY TO MY 2002 SENTENCING COURT [74. AND 80.], AND THEREBY EXCEEDING RIGHTS OF THE SA GOVERNMENT' ([SEE TEXT AT 870. IBID], [85.], [82. AND 83.], [45.]), AS

1751. 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', CLEARLY PROVES, THAT MY IMPOSED SENTENCE AND INTRINSIC SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS ATTACHED TO RELEVANT 'DATES' AND 'PERIODS OF TIME' [SEE TEXT AT 1612. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE), IBID], MUST BE OBSERVED AND ENFORCED BY SA GOVERNMENT AND THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, AS 'THAT' IS ALL THAT THEY

ARE JURISDICTIONALLY AUTHORISED TO ENFORCE AGAINST ME, WHICH ALSO SHOWS THAT THE TEXT QUOTED AT [TEXT 1699, IBID], IS ONLY A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT THE SA GOVERNMENT GENERALLY DOES (AT THAT TIME, BEING 1999), BUT DOES NOT GO ANY FURTHER THAN 'THAT', THEREFORE, SAID TEXT [AT 1699, IBID], IS NOT A RULING DECLARATION OF WHAT MUST BE DONE (THEREAFTER), IT IS ONLY A REFERENCE TO WHAT IS GENERALLY CURRENTLY BEING DONE ([SEE TEXT AT 1647. TO 1652. (INCLUSIVE), IBID], [SEE TEXT AT 1611. TO 1663. (INCLUSIVE), IBID]).

IT APPEARS THAT [TEXT AT 1700. IBID], IS SUGGESTING 'THE PAROLE BOARD' HAD ITS OWN AUTHORITY (UNFETTERED), TO ORDER PAROLE-RELEASE OF A LIFER, WHICH, IS ACTUALLY (PER STATUTE DUE PROCESS), NOT THE CASE AT ALL. HOWEVER, ^{THERE} WAS A DEGREE OF SIGNIFICANT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY, HELD BY THE BOARD, WHICH IS UNCHALLENGEABLE BY 'SA GOVERNMENT ACTION/CONDUCT', RELATING TO 'LIFERS' PAROLE APPLICATION PROCESS' (AND WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED BY ME IN THIS DOCUMENT), WHICH MEANT THAT AFTER 'LIFER' HAD APPLIED FOR PAROLE-RELEASE, AND ALSO AGREED TO DESIGNATED 'CONDITIONS', THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA DID NOT HOLD ANY JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO 'REFUSE TO PAROLE-RELEASE' RESPECTIVE 'LIFER' (AS STATED IN ANDREWS [207.], PARAGRAPH 15. ("THE AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT", "PURSUANT TO THAT SECTION, THE [LIFER] HAD THE RIGHT TO REMISSIONS AND TO BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED ON PAROLE, SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS, AT THE EXPIRATION OF THE NON-PAROLE PERIOD SET BY THE COURT."), PARAGRAPH 20. ("THOSE SECTIONS OF THE ORIGINAL ACT WERE REPEALED AND SUBSTITUTED BY THE AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT IN 1984. A NEW S. 66 PROVIDED FOR THE AUTOMATIC RELEASE ON PAROLE OF ALL PRISONERS."),

"66. (3) WHERE A PRISONER WHO IS SERVING A SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS TO BE RELEASED ON PAROLE, THE BOARD -

(A) SHALL RECOMMEND TO THE GOVERNOR THE PERIOD, BEING A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS NOR MORE THAN TEN, FOR WHICH THE PRISONER SHOULD CONTINUE ON PAROLE;

AND

1760. (B) SHALL FORWARD A COPY OF ITS RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE PERIOD OF PAROLE AND CONDITIONS TO WHICH THE RELEASE ON PAROLE IS TO BE SUBJECT TO THE GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL.

1761. (5.) A PRISONER SHALL NOT BE RELEASED PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION UNTIL -

1762. (A) THE CONDITIONS TO WHICH HIS RELEASE ON PAROLE WILL BE SUBJECT TO HAVE BEEN FIXED OR RECOMMENDED BY THE BOARD AND, IF THE CASE SO REQUIRES, APPROVED BY THE GOVERNOR, PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION;

1763. AND

1764. (B) THE PRISONER HAS ACCEPTED THOSE CONDITIONS IN WRITING.

1765. (6) WHERE A PRISONER REFUSES OR FAILS TO ACCEPT THE CONDITIONS TO WHICH HIS RELEASE ON PAROLE IS TO BE SUBJECT, THE BOARD SHALL REVIEW THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRISONER AT INTERVALS FIXED BY THE BOARD, BEING NOT LESS THAN THREE MONTHS NOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR.

1766. (7) IF, AFTER CARRYING OUT A REVIEW PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION (6), THE BOARD IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE PRISONER WILL ACCEPT THE CONDITIONS TO WHICH HIS RELEASE ON PAROLE IS TO BE SUBJECT, THE BOARD MAY ORDER THE RELEASE OF THE PRISONER FROM PRISON ON PAROLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ACT UPON THE WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE BY THE PRISONER OF THOSE CONDITIONS. ”),

AND,

1767. FURTHER ASSISTANCE FROM PARAGRAPH 24. (IN FULL), AND PARAGRAPH 25 (IN FULL), FROM ANDREWS [207.],

ALSO,

1768. IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT THE QUOTING IN PARAGRAPH 25, FROM MAXWELL V. MURPHY (1957) 96 CLR 261, AT 267, HAS STRONG SIMILARITIES TO THE LANGUAGE IN PINDER [208.], ADDING FURTHER FOUNDATION TO MY COMPLAINT THAT PARLIAMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENT, HAVE ARBITRARILY TAKEN THAT WHICH ONLY A COMPETENT COURT HOLDS JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY (AND

COMPETENCE, TO RECEIVE INTO DEBATE, RECEIVE FOR CONSIDERATION, CREATE AND DETERMINE DECISION, THEN DELIVER SAID DECISION, AND IF SO REQUIRED THEN ALSO SUBSTITUTE EXISTING DECISION AND PENALTY WITH SAID NEW DECISION/PENALTY), OVER, BEING THE

1769. 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS' ASSOCIATED WITH APPLICATION OF 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS ([74., 77., 78., 79. AND 80.]), TO MY 2002 RESENTENCING HEARING [74.], FOR REINSTATEMENT OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' 'FEATURES' [SEE TEXT

AT 1755. AND 1756, 1611. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE), 1627, IBID], TO AND AS ORDERED BY 1770. THE COMPETENT COURT IN 2002 [74.], WHICH MUST THEN INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE

OPERATIONAL AND PRACTICAL EFFECT OF SAME 'FEATURES' (PROVIDING THEN THE TRUE ACTUAL 'NPP DATE', THE '30 DAY WINDOW FOR PAROLE RELEASE' ([126.]), THE TRUE 'PAROLE START DATE', THE 'MAXIMUM PAROLE LENGTH' (10 YEARS), THE TRUE 'PAROLE END DATE', THE SATISFACTION OF SENTENCE DATE [SEE TEXT AT 1758. IBID]), BUT

1771. ALSO THE DUE PROCESS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL PROTECTION OF SAME SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT 'FEATURES' ([SEE TEXT AT 1633. TO. 1641. (INCLUSIVE), IBID]),

1772. HENCE, [RETURN TO 1755.]

THE TITLE'S COMMON NAME (OF THE RESPECTIVE ACT BEING "THE AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT" [SEE TEXT AT 1755. IBID]), HOWEVER, THE BOARD, CONTRARY TO THE WORDING OF SAID PARAGRAPH 56. [SEE TEXT AT 1695. IBID], DESCRIBED AT

[TEXT AT 1700. IBID], DID NOT HOLD THE 'AUTHORITY ITSELF TO ORDER RELEASE OF THE PRISONER.', AS THE BOARD COULD ONLY HOLD [REDACTED] 'CONDITIONAL AUTHORITY' TO DIRECT THE SA GOVERNMENT TO PAROLE-RELEASE RESPECTIVE

1773. LIFER, AND ONCE THE BOARD MADE THE STATE GOVERNMENT'S RULING TO 'PAROLE-RELEASE', THE PROGRESSION TO PAROLE WAS THEN DETERMINED AS 'IT WILL

HAPPEN, BUT GOVERNOR MUST SIGN-OFF (SIGNATURE REQUIRED [29.]), THE PRE-REQUISITE CONDITIONS ('DATE OF RELEASE' WITHIN 30 DAY WINDOW, AS

INDICATED AT [126.], AND 'PERIOD OF PAROLE LENGTH, THREE TO TEN YEARS', AS INDICATED AT [TEXT 1758, 1759, 1760. IBID]), PER [TEXT 1761. TO 1764.

1775. (INCLUSIVE), IBID], AND THAT PROCEDURAL PROCESS THEN [REDACTED] CERTIFIES THE BOARD

TO EFFECT THE MAKING OF A DOCUMENT, ON WHICH IS WRITTEN (AS A FORMAL NOTIFICATION TO THE PRISONER, BY THE BOARD, ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF SOUTH

Australia), the 'DATE OF PAROLE-RELEASE', 'LENGTH OF PAROLE', AND 'OTHER DETAILS', AS THE AGREED-UPON PARTICULARS SIGNED-OFF BY ALL THREE MAIN PARTIES (THE BOARD, GOVERNOR, RESPECTIVE LIFER), THEREFORE, THE BOARD WAS THE OFFICIATOR OF THE PROCEDURAL ACTIONS TO BE COMPLIED WITH (WHICH CARRIED WITH IT THE 'SIGNIFICANT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY' REQUIRED, AND THE 'CONDITIONAL AUTHORITY' TO ACT UPON AND WITH ~~THE BOARD'S~~ COMPETENCE).

FOR THOSE REASONS MAINLY, THE BOARD NEVER HAD (WITHIN 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT'), 'ITS OWN AUTHORITY TO RELEASE', THEREFORE, THE SUGGESTION AT [TEXT 1700. IBID], IS MISLEADING TO SUGGEST 'BOARD NO LONGER HAS'. THE BOARD HAD A PART TO PLAY, BUT, ITS PART WAS ONE OF THREE MAIN PARTIES (BOARD, GOVERNOR, PRISONER), NOT, ONE OF TWO MAIN PARTIES (BOARD, PRISONER). THE BOARD ALONE WOULD MAKE THE PAROLE-RELEASE ORDER, BUT QUALIFICATIONS WERE NEEDED TO CERTIFY SUCH ORDER.

IT APPEARS THAT [TEXT AT 1701. IBID], IS SUGGESTING 'A FACT IN LAW', THAT 'THE GOVERNOR [29.], OWN THE RIGHT TO GRANT OR DENY PAROLE-RELEASE TO A LIFER' (PAROLE-APPLICANT), AND, TO VETO THE 'BOARD'S' ~~RECOMMENDATION~~ RECOMMENDATION TO PAROLE-RELEASE, AND, ALL SOUTH AUSTRALIAN 'LIFERS' ARE THEREFORE SERVING 'LIFE SENTENCES' AT GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE (IRRESPECTIVE OF WHEN LIFER WAS SENTENCED, AND, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT YEAR'S SENTENCING STANDARDS WERE APPLIED TO INDIVIDUAL LIFERS' IMPOSED SENTENCE, BY THEIR RESPECTIVE SENTENCING COURT (BASICALLY, THAT SOUTH AUSTRALIA SENTENCE-ENFORCEMENT-PROCEDURES HAD BEEN CHANGED BY SA PARLIAMENT, SEEMINGLY COMPETENT, AS NO PERSON HAD PREVIOUSLY FORCED COURT TO INVESTIGATE 'CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] LEGALITY OF SUCH 'PROCEDURE' CHANGES' (NOT LIKE THIS DOCUMENT REVEALS))). HOWEVER, WHAT THE COURT WAS STATING WAS ONLY A REFERENCE TO WHAT 'CURRENTLY' (BEING 1999), HAPPENS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, BUT, IN NO WAY DOES IT 'JUSTIFY', 'AUTHORISE', OR 'VALIDATE' SUCH ACTIONS OF OR BY THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT (TO PASS RELATED AMENDMENTS), SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNOR (TO ASSENT PASSED BILLS INTO STATUTE), AND SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT (TO ACTION, ACT ON, AND APPLY 'SUCH PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES' WHICH THEY CLAIM TO OWN THE

- COMPETENT AUTHORITY AND POWER TO PERFORM/EFFECT OPERATIONALLY, WITHOUT ANY BARRIER OR HURDLE TO THEM ARBITRARILY APPLYING SUCH 'PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES',
1786. TO ALL 'LIFER' PRISONERS), AS, THE COURT DID NOT CALL TO QUESTION THE CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]), COMPETENCE (RIGHT TO EXIST), OF THE 'RIGHT TO EXIST OR 'RIGHT TO BE APPLIED OR 'RIGHT TO BE ENFORCED' ASPECTS/CHARACTER, OF SAID 'GOVERNOR AND EXECUTIVE COUNCIL/CABINET' [SEE TEXT AT 1701. IBID], ACTIONS, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES; THE COURT WAS ONLY STATING THAT THAT WAS THE CURRENT PROCESS IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA (AT THE TIME OF THAT COURT'S SITTING).
1787. AS DETAILED BY ME WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT, BETWEEN THE START OF SAID 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' [SEE TEXT AT 1756. IBID], AND AT LEAST UP TO 2010 (IT WAS ACTUALLY A LOT LATER THAN 2010, AND, I WOULD ACTUALLY STATE AS A MATTER OF FACT IN CURRENT LAW IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA, THAT 'IT' IS STILL NOT HELD IN CH.II [3.], BUT FOR THE SAKE OF THIS POINT I WILL INDICATE SAID PERIOD OF TIME TO 2010),
1788. NO S.A. PRISONER-LIFER, SENTENCED COMPETENTLY (PER MURDER CONVICTION), FOR MURDER CRIME WHICH HAPPENED BETWEEN SAME DATES, WAS EVER SENTENCED PURSUANT TO/CONSISTENT WITH, ANY SENTENCING STANDARDS EQUAL TO 'GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE' (SEE REFERENCE IN ANDREWS [207.],
1789. PARAGRAPH 19. ("PURSUANT TO SS 66. TO 68. OF THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT 1982 (SA) AS ORIGINALLY ENACTED ("THE ORIGINAL ACT"), PRISONERS SERVING LIFE SENTENCES WERE ENTITLED TO APPLY TO THE PAROLE BOARD FOR RELEASE ON PAROLE. AFTER HAVING REGARD TO A NUMBER OF MATTERS IN DETERMINING THE PRISONER'S APPLICATION, THE PAROLE BOARD COULD RECOMMEND THE PRISONER'S RELEASE ON PAROLE
1790. TO THE GOVERNOR, WHO UPON SUCH A RECOMMENDATION COULD RELEASE THE PRISONER ON PAROLE FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN THREE YEARS AND NOT MORE THAN TEN YEARS,
1791. RELEASE WAS NOT AUTOMATIC."))),
1792. WHEREBY,
- THE 'LIFER PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION', SUBMITTED BY RESPECTIVE LIFER, WAS ONLY GRANTED AT THE PLEASURE OF THE GOVERNOR [29.], WHO OWNED THE 'ABSOLUTE DISCRETION' TO 'GRANT' OR 'NOT GRANT', HENCE THE TERM GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE.
1793. PURSUANT TO THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', NOT ONLY WAS THE 'ABSOLUTE

DISCRETION⁹ OF THE GOVERNOR ([29.]), EXPUNGED FROM DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATION.

1794. OF LIFER'S PAROLE-RELEASE PROCEDURES (IN SIMPLY TERMS, THE GOVERNOR [29.], DID NOT OWN OR HOLD ANY JURISDICTIONAL POWER, AUTHORITY OR VETO OVER/ABOVE THE PAROLE BOARD, RELATING TO LIFER-PAROLE RELEASE APPLICATIONS, THEREFORE, ALL THE GOVERNOR WAS PERMITTED TO DO TO SUCH LIFER'S APPLICATION, WAS 'APPROVE PAROLE-

1795. RELEASE' (POSITIVE, AFFIRMATIVE FORM ONLY [64.], THERE WAS NO NEGATIVE FORM OPEN TO THE GOVERNOR [29.], AND, FREE OF ANY NEGATIVE FORM/PROVISO MEANS NO

1796. RIGHT/JURISDICTION TO ASSUME, EITHER), WITHIN THE VERY LIMITED 'SCOPE OF JURISDICTION OPEN TO GOVERNOR' (EXAMPLE, AS THE TERM OF PAROLE WAS BETWEEN THREE AND TEN YEARS, IT PROVIDED SOME DISCRETION TO GOVERNOR TO REJECT BOARD'S RECOMMENDED TERM OF PAROLE, BUT, WHEN ONLY ONE NUMBER OF PAROLE DAYS REMAINS (BETWEEN THREE YEARS AND TEN YEARS LEAVES MANY DAYS TO CHOOSE FROM, RE PAROLE TERM), ALL DISCRETION IS VACATED AND UPON THE 'LAST' NUMBER OF DAYS, FOR PAROLE TERM, GOVERNOR [29.] "MUST" ([30. ("SHALL")]),

1797. ONLY APPROVE BOARD'S RECOMMENDED PERIOD OF PAROLE), AS WORDED BY STATUTORY OBLIGATION UPON THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA [SEE TEXT AT 1760. IBID], "TO WHICH RELEASE ON PAROLE IS TO BE SUBJECT", THEN, THE 'POSITIVE/AFFIRMATIVE FORM', "TO THE GOVERNOR FOR APPROVAL", NOT FOR ANY FINAL VETO ASSESSMENT RE PAROLE RELEASE OUTRIGHT, INSTEAD, ONLY THE SIGNATURE OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT (IS BASICALLY WHAT IT BREAKS DOWN TO, A MERE

1798. SIGNATURE ONLY), SO THAT WHEN [125., 126., 127. AND 128.], ARE APPLIED TO A LIFER'S SENTENCE AS THEY WERE CONSTRUCTED TO BE APPLIED, AS ABSOLUTE SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS OWNED BY RESPECTIVE LIFERS, OBLIGATED AS MANDATORY OPERATIONAL EFFECTS UPON OPERATIONS OF STATE GOVERNMENT, WHEN EFFECTING DUE PROCESS ACTIONS OF PAROLE-RELEASE PROCEDURES, THE EFFECT OF OBSERVATION AND APPLICATION OF SUCH SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS, IS NOT DISCRETIONARY, THEY MUST BE UPHELD BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT WHO ACT AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER'),

1799. BUT, [RETURN TO 1794.]

THE ONLY ROLE LEFT OPEN FOR GOVERNOR [29.], OTHER THAN A 'LEGALITY REVIEW'

OF THE PAROLE BOARD'S 'PAROLE-RELEASE RECOMMENDATION ORDER', IS, TO APPROVE
 THAT ORDER (BY WAY OF SAID 'VERY LIMITED SCOPE OF JURISDICTION WHICH REMAINS
 1800. OPEN TO GOVERNOR [29.]', [SEE TEXT AT 1796. IBID]). THE JURISDICTION,
 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF GOVERNOR [29.], HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED/LIMITED
 BY STATUTE ('THE AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT'), TO PROVIDING THE SIGNATURE OF
 1801. CERTIFICATION TO THE BOARD'S 'PAROLE-RELEASE ORDER'. SUCH A SIGNATURE
 WAS PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED FOR A DEATH ORDER (COURT'S SENTENCE, UNTIL REPEAL
 1802. OF DEATH ORDER LEGISLATION [50. (PARAGRAPHS 32, 55.)]). THE GOVERNOR'S
 SIGNATURE OF CERTIFICATION REMAINED A PRE-REQUISITE FOR PAROLE OF A
 1803. LIFER, ~~■~~ EVEN WITHIN THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', HOWEVER, THE SCOPE OF
COMPETENT JURISDICTION OF GOVERNOR [29.], WITHIN THE SENTENCING
STANDARDS GOVERNED BY THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', NO LONGER HAD
OPEN TO IT ([29.]), ANY 'ABSOLUTE DISCRETION', THEREIN REDEFINING THE
ACTUAL JURISDICTION OF [29.], PER 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', TO 'AN ENTITY
WHICH MUST ONLY APPROVE BOARD'S DECISION/RECOMMENDATION TO PAROLE-
RELEASE', AGAIN WITH RETURN TO TITLE OF ACT, THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT',
 1804. WHICH ALSO PLACED A SIGNIFICANT JURISDICTIONAL RIGHT (RELATING TO A LIFER'S
 PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION SUBMISSION), IN THE HANDS OF RESPECTIVE LIFER PAROLE-
 1805. RELEASE APPLICANT, SO MUCH SO, AND TO THE EFFECT THAT, ONCE RESPECTIVE LIFER
HAD SUBMITTED THEIR PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION (WITHIN PERMITTED PERIOD, AND,
 ACCORDING TO PROCEDURES RELATING TO WHEN THEY COULD APPLY FOR PAROLE
 (SEE TIME SEQUENCE PER [126.])), AND COMPLIED WITH ALL RELEVANT
 1806. PRE-REQUISITE CONDITIONS (EXAMPLE, PRISONER MUST SIGN TO ACCEPT THE
 PAROLE-RELEASE "CONDITIONS" [SEE TEXT AT 1761, 1762, 1763, 1764, 1765, ~~■~~
 1807. 1766. IBID]), THERE WAS NO COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL RIGHT, POWER, AUTHORITY,
OPEN/AVAILABLE TO THE SA GOVERNMENT, WITHIN CH. II [3.], OR WITHIN
 OPERATION OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, S.A. ([85.]), WHICH COULD INVALIDATE
 THE 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHT' OWNED BY RESPECTIVE LIFER, TO RECEIVE
PAROLE-RELEASE, AND, FOR A MAXIMUM OF TEN YEARS ONLY [SEE TEXT AT
 1808. 1758. IBID.]. THIS 'CONDITION' OPEN ONLY TO RESPECTIVE LIFER-APPLICANT,

- PER 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', WHEREBY THE LIFER WAS THE ONE WHO HELD THE 'ABSOLUTE DISCRETION', OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY RECEIVED PAROLE, BECAUSE OF THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF THEIR WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE [SEE TEXT AT 1764, 1766.
1809. IBID.], EFFECTIVELY PUT RESPECTIVE LIFER IN THE 'GOVERNING POSITION OF THEIR OWN PAROLE, ABOVE THE BOARD AND GOVERNOR [29.]' (PUT SIMPLY, IF RESPECTIVE LIFER DID NOT WANT PAROLE (FOR WHATEVER REASON), THEY ~~■~~ WOULD CHOOSE NOT TO SIGN THEIR 'PAROLE-CONDITIONS RELEASE FORM' FROM THE BOARD [SEE
1810. TEXT AT 1765, 1766. IBID.]). WITHOUT SAID GOVERNOR'S 'ABSOLUTE DISCRETION', OF 'PAROLE RELEASE OR NOT, FOR RESPECTIVE LIFER, PURSUANT TO 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' (AS ABOVE DESCRIBED), PLUS THE ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS UPON THE
1811. COMPETENT JURISDICTION, OF GOVERNOR [29.], AND PAROLE BOARD, ONCE THE LIFER HAD SUBMITTED THEIR PAROLE-RELEASE APPLICATION (IN ACCORDANCE WITH DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES), PLUS THE SUBSTANTIVE/ACCURED RIGHTS OWNED BY SAID LIFER, PER THEIR COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE (PURSUANT TO 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SENTENCING
1812. STANDARDS), MEANT THAT, SAID LIFER, OWNED THE ACCRUED RIGHT TO PAROLE, OWNED THE ACCRUED RIGHT TO RELEASE ON PAROLE [139.], OWNED THE TIME PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THEY MUST BE PAROLE-RELEASED [126.], OWNED THE PERIOD OF TIME MAXIMUM TO SERVE ON PAROLE [SEE TEXT AT 1758. IBID.], OWNED THE OBSERVANCE APPLICATION OF SATISFACTION OF THEIR IMPOSED SENTENCE [SEE TEXT AT 1615. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE), IBID.], OWNED THE SUBSTANTIVE/ACCURED RIGHT TO SA GOVERNMENT'S COMPLIANCE WITH
1813. OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF IMPOSED SENTENCE (TO THE QUALIFICATION THAT THEIR SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON THEM, WAS FULLY CREATED AND KNOWN AND LOCKED-IN AT THE POINT OF SENTENCE DELIVERY [37., 44., 45. AND 196.], NOT ONLY KNOWN BY LIFER BEING SENTENCED, BUT ALSO KNOWN BY SENTENCING COURT ~~■~~, WHICH ALSO ADDS A RIGHT OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTION TO SAID SENTENCING COURT'S CREATION, SAID 'SENTENCE', WHEREBY IT CANNOT INCUR INCREASE TO IMPOSED PENALTY BY ANY COMPETENT MEANS, OTHER THAN A CH. III COMPETENT COURT ([3.])),
1814. WHICH WAS ALL CONSEQUENTIAL TO THE POWER-SHIFT AND AUTHORITY-SHIFT, BORNE FROM
1815. OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', WHICH THEN, EMPOWERED RESPECTIVE LIFER, IN STATUTORY WAYS, WHICH SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LIFERS (WITH NPP IMPOSED),

HAD NEVER BEFORE EXPERIENCED FROM THEIR IMPOSED SENTENCES, OR FROM RELEVANT SENTENCING STANDARDS (INCORPORATED INTRINSICALLY WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE SENTENCE).

1816. BRAND NEW POWER AND AUTHORITY WAS THEN OWNED BY INDIVIDUAL LIFE (IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA), UNDER OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT'. EVEN

PARLIAMENT, WHO CREATED THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', HAD NO PREVIOUS OPERATION OF SIMILAR STATUTE TO FALL BACK TO (AS A GUIDE OF SORTS), WHEN THE PARLIAMENT DECIDED TO REPEAL THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', WHICH I THINK IS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE PARLIAMENTS OF S.A., EFFECTIVELY STEALING THE ACCRUED RIGHTS OF OPERATIONAL EFFECT, OF REMISSIONS CALCULATIONS AND AUTOMATIC PAROLE-RELEASE, WHICH RESPECTIVE LIFEERS OWNED (PER SENTENCING STANDARDS OF THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', BEING IMPOSED UPON THEM BY THEIR SENTENCING COURT).

1818. FROM THOSE LIFEERS, WHEN VOTING IN PARLIAMENT, THE APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS AND COMPONENTS OF THE NEW AMENDING PROVISIONS, NOT ONLY FOR THE LIFEERS WHO WERE ALREADY SENTENCED, OR THE PERSONS YET TO BE CONVICTED AND THEN SENTENCED (IF CRIME HAPPENED BETWEEN THE FIRST DAY OF OPERATION OF THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', AND 1-8-1994 (FIRST DAY OF OPERATION OF THE AMENDED ACT [46.3])), BUT ALSO,

1820. FOR THOSE PERSONS WHO ARE 'ARRESTED', CONVICTED AND THEN SENTENCED (WHEN THE CRIME ITSELF HAPPENED BETWEEN SAID TWO DATES [SEE TEXT AT 1819. IBID]), IN SOME CASES MANY YEARS AFTER FIRST DAY OF OPERATION OF [46.3] (1-8-1994),

AND ALSO, 1821. FOR THOSE PERSONS WHO ARE 'RE-SENTENCED', IN SOME CASES MANY YEARS AFTER FIRST DAY OF OPERATION OF [46.3] (1-8-1994), WHEREBY 'RE-SENTENCING' COURT IMPOSING COMPETENT SENTENCE, 'APPLIES' SENTENCING STANDARDS OPERATIONAL ON A SPECIFIC DATE (OF THE CRIME), TO THE RESPECTIVE LIFEERS, DELIVERED AND IMPOSED NEW SENTENCE, 'AND', SUCH SENTENCING STANDARDS BEING SO 'APPLIED', ARE IN FACT PRE-EXISTING SENTENCING STANDARDS [WHICH, AT THE TIME OF IMPOSED NEW SENTENCE, ARE/WERE REPEALED (WHICH WAS ALSO CLEARLY KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD BY THE 'RE-SENTENCING' COURT), YET, STRICTLY RE-IMPOSED COMPETENTLY BY THE

1824. RESPECTIVE 'RE-SENTENCING' COURT, BECAUSE, FOR EXAMPLE, IF LOOKING AT THE
 1825. REASONS OF THE FULL COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, AS TO 'WHY' THEY 'IMPOSED'
 '1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS IN MY 2002 RE-SENTENCING [74.]', THE 'COURT
 WAS NOT PERMITTED TO APPLY ANY OTHER SENTENCING STANDARDS TO MY IMPOSED AND
 DELIVERED SENTENCE, OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH OPERATIONALLY APPLIED AT THE TIME
 1826. THE CRIME HAPPENED' ([72., 75., 79., 80., 78. AND 77.]), PLUS, THE EXISTING
 AUTHORITIES OF [131.] (HIGH COURT MATTER FROM SOUTH AUSTRALIA), AND [135.],
 SUSTAIN THE 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS' OWNED BY SUCH A LIFER (AS MYSELF),
 'TO HAVE REINSTATED BY A 'RE-SENTENCING' COURT, ORIGINAL COMPETENT SENTENCING
 1827. STANDARDS', ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE IS A DRAMATIC 'SHIFT/REMOVAL' OF SPECIFIC
AND BINDING STATUTORY RIGHTS, FROM PRE-EXISTING SENTENCING
 1828. STANDARDS, COMPARED TO THE REPEALING STATUTE 'WHICH IN MY 'RE-
 SENTENCING HEARING IN 2002, WAS TO 'ABROGATE [46.] FROM SENTENCE
CONSIDERATION, THEN TO ONLY APPLY THE PERMITTED 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS TO
SAID 2002 SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON ME, AND TO ANCHOR EXACTLY WHAT ORDERS
OF SAID RE-SENTENCING COURT MUST BE ENFORCED AGAINST ME, BY THE
CH. II [3.], S.A. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', AS
STATED BY SAID COMPETENT COURT, SUCH AS [75., 79., 78., 80. AND 77.]),
 1829. SO THEN, [RETURN TO 1817, 1818, 1819.]
DUE TO [46.], REPEALING A DRAMATIC AND 'LIFER-EMPOWERING' ENVIRONMENT OF
SENTENCING STANDARDS, WHICH FORMED THE 'STATUTORY SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED
RIGHTS', WITHIN THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', OF THE 'REMISSIONS REGIME' AND
 1830. THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE/AUTOMATIC RELEASE REGIME' (WHICH, FROM THE OPERATIONAL
EFFECTS OF SAME, GAVE RESPECTIVE LIFERS THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW RIGHT TO
RECEIVE SAID OPERATIONAL EFFECTS, OF THE REMISSIONS REGIME 'REDUCTION OF
'NPP OF TIME', WHICH THEY MUST REMAIN INCARCERATED', AND, THE AUTOMATIC
PAROLE - RELEASE REGIME MANDATING SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT RELEASE LIFER
 ON PAROLE, AND, THAT PAROLE RELEASE MUST HAPPEN WITHIN A STRICTLY
 CALCULATED PERIOD OF A '30 DAY WINDOW' [126.], AND, THE 'PAROLE PERIOD
OF TIME WHICH WAS ALSO CAPPED AT ~~THE~~ TEN YEARS [127. AND 128.]', AND,

1831. THE ISSUE OF NO SIMILAR STATUTE TO FALL BACK TO (AS A GUIDE TO ASSIST THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, IN THEIR UNDERSTANDING AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE TRUE VALUE, WEIGHT AND AUTHORITY OF SAID 'REMISSIONS' AND 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE-RELEASE' REGIMES, INCLUDING THAT BOTH REGIMES WERE JUDICIALLY PROTECTED AS 'IMPOSED SENTENCES', AND IN MY CASE ([74.]), BOTH REGIMES' OPERATIONAL EFFECTS WERE RE-INSTATED AND RE-IMPOSED IN 2002 BY THE FULL COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, APPROXIMATELY EIGHT YEARS AFTER [46.] (1-8-1994),
1832. STARTED OPERATING, HOWEVER, LACK OF PARLIAMENTARY (S.A.), COMPREHENSION OF JUDGMENTS SUCH AS MINE IN 2002 [74., 79., 80., 78. AND 77.], WHEREIN THE SENTENCING COURT (CH. III [3.]), IMPOSES SENTENCE UPON A LIFER, THEREBY INSTRUCTING S.A. GOVERNMENT WHAT 'SENTENCE TO ENFORCE UPON RESPECTIVE
1833. LIFER' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 870. IBID], AND, IGNORANCE OF S.A. GOVERNMENT ABOUT THEIR COMPETENT CONSTITUTIONAL ([1.]), AUTHORITY, POWER AND JURISDICTION,
1834. WHEN ACTING AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' (TO THE EFFECT, AND ALSO TO THE ILLEGALLY CAUSED DETRIMENT, OF AND TO RESPECTIVE LIFER, THAT, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE BY S.A. GOVERNMENT RESULTS FROM 'THEIR FALSE BELIEF AND CLAIM', ABOUT THEIR PURPORTED ABILITY TO INTERPRET THE OFFICIAL MEANING OF THE WORDS OF MY SAID 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], BUT WITHOUT THE COURTS' INTENDED TRUE MEANING TO SUPPORT OR JUSTIFY, WHAT THE S.A. GOVERNMENT ALLEGES AS FACT (RE 'OBLIGATIONS, NPP LENGTH, VALID SENTENCING STANDARDS TO APPLY', ETC.), CONSEQUENTIAL TO S.A. GOVERNMENT ARROGANCE, ULTRA VIRES CONDUCT, JURISDICTIONAL FRAUD [82. AND
1835. 83.]), MEANT THAT THE 'S.A. PARLIAMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENT DIDN'T REALLY APPRECIATE THE ERRORS/VIOLATIONS OF PROTECTED RIGHTS OF CERTAIN SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LIFERS, CONSEQUENTIAL TO OPERATION OF [46.] (AGAINST THEM)', UNDER THE 'CLAIMED BELIEF' OF THE SA GOVERNMENT, THAT IT HAD ABSOLUTE JURISDICTIONAL POWER OVER HOW IT ENFORCED A LIFER'S SENTENCE, IRRESPECTIVE OF LIFER BEING
1836. SENTENCED PURSUANT TO THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT SENTENCING STANDARDS', AND, UNDER SUCH A 'CLAIMED BELIEF' (WHICH WAS COMPARATIVELY HELD ALSO BY THE PARLIAMENT IN 1994, AT THE TIME OF DEBATE OF 'STATUTES AMENDMENT (TRUTH IN SENTENCING) BILL' [51.]), IT ALSO 'CLAIMED' PARLIAMENTARY JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY TO SIMPLY

- STOP OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF 'REMISSIONS CALCULATIONS', AND 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE-RELEASE', BUT, THE ARBITRARY ACTIONS OF SA PARLIAMENT AND SA GOVERNMENT, WITH NO HINT OF 'PROVISO', 'SPECIAL CONSIDERATION CLAUSES', OR SIMILAR STATUTORY OPTION WITHIN THE 1994 STATUTES [46.], WAS ALSO THE ONGOING FRAUDULENT FOUNDATION ([194. (PARA. 64. "FRAUD")], [82. AND 83.]), FOR
1838. LATER AMENDMENTS TO THE 'TRUTH IN SENTENCING ACT' [46.] (SUCH AS [102., 103., 104., 105., 114., 115., 116., 117., 118., 119., 120., 121., 140. TO 161. (INCLUSIVE), 162. TO 178. (INCLUSIVE), 179. TO 186. (INCLUSIVE), 187. TO 193. (INCLUSIVE)], WHICH WAS PASSED BY S.A. UPPER AND LOWER HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, UNDER SAID ENVELOPE OF FALSE BELIEF, ABOUT THE JURISDICTIONAL POWER OF S.A. PARLIAMENT, WHEN TRYING TO/INTENDING TO AMEND 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS HELD AND OWNED BY RESPECTIVE LIFERS' (SUCH AS ME, WHO ALSO WERE SENTENCED PURSUANT TO THE
1839. 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT'), AND, AS SUCH AMENDMENTS PROVE, 'S.A. PARLIAMENTS BELIEVED AND ACTED (VIA FORMAL VOTES), AS THOUGH THEY COULD SIMPLY TAKE AWAY THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE AND AUTOMATIC RELEASE', FROM ALL FUTURE APPLICATIONS (FOR PAROLE-RELEASE), BY SAID LIFERS, BY REGARDING THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF 'THE AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT'
1840. AS PROCEDURAL ONLY, NOT SUBSTANTIVE, EFFECTIVELY, ~~THEY~~ TREATING SAID 'AUTO PAROLE' AND 'AUTO RELEASE' AND 'REMISSIONS SYSTEM CALCULATIONS
1841. ([126.])', AS 'PRIVILEGES HELD BY SUCH LIFERS', RATHER THAN WHAT THEY ACTUALLY WERE, WHICH WAS 'ACCRUED AND SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATORY RIGHTS', MEANING THAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT MUST ONLY ENFORCE THE TRUE OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF AN IMPOSED SENTENCE (UPON RESPECTIVE LIFER), AND MUST NOT UNDERMINE OR DISSOLVE (VIOLATE), ^{ANY} ~~THE~~ SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED UPON 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 870. IBID], BY ANY COMPETENT SENTENCING/RE-SENTENCING COURT'
- WHICH, [WHEN CONSIDERING SUBSTANTIVE, PROCEDURAL, SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL MIXTURE]
1842. WITH REGARD TO PINDER [208.], THE RESPECTIVE SENTENCING COURT, FREED FROM ANY PROCEDURAL CHANGES THAT MIGHT APPEAR TO REPLACE A JUDICIAL
1843. JUDGMENT WITH A LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT' (LIKE WHEN MY 2002 JUDGMENT

- [74.], ⁶ 'WAS TREATED BY SA GOVERNMENT AS NO DIFFERENT THAN A 'TRUTH IN SENTENCING ACT' SENTENCE', ⁶ 'RATHER THAN WHAT THE COURT ORDERED IT TO BE TREATED AS, BEING EQUAL TO AN 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SENTENCE [78., 79., 80. AND 77.]', ⁶ 'CONSEQUENTIAL TO [46.] EXISTING, CARRYING WITH IT A VARIETY OF NEW PROCEDURES, AFFECTING SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED SENTENCING RIGHTS, OF LIFERS, ACCORDING TO WHAT THE STATE GOVERNMENT CLAIMED TO BE ALLOWABLE, AND THE STATE PARLIAMENT (WHEN DEBATING STATUTES AMENDMENT (TRUTH IN SENTENCING) BILL IN 1994), WRONGLY BELIEVED TO BE WITHIN THEIR COMPETENT JURISDICTION OF POWER),
1844. ⁶ SUCH A SENTENCING COURT (WHICH INCLUDES RE-SENTENCING COURTS TOO), MUST IMPOSE A PROPER SENTENCE ACCORDING TO SENTENCING STANDARDS APPLYING AT TIME CRIME ACTUALLY HAPPENED ([72. AND 80.]), AND IN SO IMPOSING IT MUST ALSO KNOW WHAT 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS' IT IS ENSURING BE RECEIVED, BY SUCH SENTENCED LIFER, AND MUST ALSO KNOW WHAT 'PROCEDURAL RIGHTS (TO PROTECT THOSE 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 870, 1612. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE) IBID])', IT IS ENSURING BE RECEIVED, BY SUCH SENTENCED LIFER, ON THAT DAY OF SENTENCING AND EVERY DAY THEREAFTER, UNTIL 'SENTENCE' IS WHOLLY
1845. SATISFIED, AND THEREFORE, ⁶ MUST ALSO KNOW WHAT 'SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS' AND 'PROCEDURAL OBLIGATIONS' IT IS IMPOSING, ON S.A. GOVERNMENT (ACTING AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 870. IBID]), SO AS TO ENSURE THE S.A. GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO AND CAPABLE OF, COMPLYING WITH SUCH A SENTENCE ORDER, WITHIN THE STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS OPEN TO OBSERVANCE AND APPLICATION BY THE S.A. GOVERNMENT, TOWARD RESPECTIVELY SENTENCED LIFER UNTIL ORDERED (BY SENTENCING COURT), SENTENCE IS "WHOLLY SATISFIED" [SEE TEXT AT 1616, 1617, 1618. IBID]',
1846. SO THEN, [RETURN TO 1839, 1840, 1842.]
- WHERE AN ACT OF PARLIAMENT CLAIMS JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO AMEND A 'SENTENCING STANDARDS PROCEDURE', AND TO SO AMEND ARBITRARILY TO ALL CURRENT
1847. AND FUTURE LIFERS, AND IN SO AMENDING ⁶ CREATES AN EFFECT UPON AN EXISTING
1848. SENTENCE, AND, THEREAFTER CLAIM SIMILAR EFFECT TO FUTURE SENTENCES WHICH ARE (OR ARE LIKELY TO BE), BACK-SENTENCED TO THE SENTENCING STANDARDS BEING

- AMENDED BY SAID ACT OF PARLIAMENT' (WHEN 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' IS REPEALED BY 'TRUTH IN SENTENCING ACT' [46.]), THEREBY ALSO CLAIMING BY OPERATION OF SUCH SENTENCING STANDARDS AMENDMENT, JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE TO CONTINUE ACTING UNTIL ONLY A REPEALING (OR RE-DEFINING), ACT OF PARLIAMENT AFFECTS ITS OPERATION
1849. (SUGGESTING ALSO THAT IT GIVES THE OPERATOR OF SUCH ACT, 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', COMPETENT AUTHORITY TO DISREGARD RELEVANT/RELATED COURT JUDGMENTS, IRRESPECTIVE OF SUCH A JUDGMENT BEING DIRECTLY LINKED TO AN
1850. INDIVIDUAL PRISONER-LIFER, FOR EXAMPLE, EVEN THOUGH IN MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], THE COURT ORDERED THAT 1992 'SENTENCING STANDARDS' "MUST" BE APPLIED TO SUCH RE-SENTENCING [80. AND 78.], TO SUCH AN OUTCOME THAT [77.], MUST BE THE OPERATIONAL EFFECT, WHICH ALSO MANDATES 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE-RELEASE' PROCEDURES TOO (NOT 'GOVERNOR'S PLEASURE' EFFECTS), S.A. GOVERNMENT DISREGARDED THE COURT'S QUALIFIED DIRECTIONS ([78.]), AS 'HERE RHETORIC WITHOUT SUBSTANCE', AND MADE ITS OWN INTERPRETATIONAL DECISION AS TO MY ACTUAL SENTENCE TO BE ENFORCED AGAINST ME, WITH THEIR ARROGANT AND DISMISSIVE EXCUSE THAT 'MY 2002 RE-SENTENCING COURT ORDER RE [80.], HAD NO OPERATIONAL EFFECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL OBLIGATION (AGAINST 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER'), AS THE '1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS ARE NO LONGER CURRENT', SUCH AS WHEN,
1851. IF COMPARING HOW [46.], AS OPERATED BY STATE GOVERNMENT ([114., 115., 116., 117., 118., 119. AND 121.]), OPERATES TO AFFECT 'RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES UNDER PROPER AND COMPETENT OPERATION OF THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT'', IT IS THEN WITHOUT DOUBT
1852. THAT THE DAY PRIOR TO START OF [46.] (WHICH COMMENCED OPERATION ON
1853. 1-8-1994), LIFERS SENTENCED PURSUANT TO 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', OWNED VERY SPECIFIC SENTENCING RIGHTS, WHICH COULD ONLY EVER BE LAWFULLY AFFECTED (AGAINST THE LIFER, SUCH AS TO INCREASE CUSTODIAL TIME, OR OTHER SENTENCE PENALTY), BY A SUPREME OR HIGH COURT JUDGE (OF A CH. III [3.] COURT), WHICH ALSO FORM CRITICAL COMPONENTS AND ELEMENTS [SEE TEXT AT 1818. IBID], OF THE RESPECTIVE INDIVIDUAL SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON THEM ([45. AND 44.], [SEE TEXT AT 1612. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE)]),

1854. THEN, [RETURN TO 1852.]

ON THE FIRST DAY OF START OF [46.], THOSE SAME LIFERS (WHO WERE SENTENCED PURSUANT TO THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', AND WHO ALSO HAD A 'NPP' IMPOSED TOO),

1855. HAD THEIR INDIVIDUAL COURT IMPOSED SENTENCES (WHICH INCLUDED COURT IMPOSED NPP), WHICH WERE LAWFULLY DETERMINED AND IMPOSED BY THE ONLY CONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]), COMPETENT AND JURISDICTIONALLY AUTHORISED PERSON/S TO IMPOSE SUCH SENTENCES UPON ~~THE~~ LIFERS (UNDER SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL LAW, FOLLOWING A MURDER CONVICTION), BEING SUPREME/HIGH COURT JUDGES ([192. ("ONLY A JUDGE OF SUPREME COURT STATUS IS ABLE TO SENTENCE A PRISONER FOR MURDER;")]), 'ALTERED, VARIED, SET ASIDE' (SEE JUDGMENT KNIGHT V VICTORIA [2017] HCA 29, M251/2015, PARAGRAPH 25), AND REPLACED (BY PRACTICAL OPERATION OF [46.]), "WITH A LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT [SENTENCE]" (SEE JUDGMENT KNIGHT V VICTORIA

1856. [2017] HCA 29, PARAGRAPH 29), FROM WHICH A 'SIGNIFICANT INTERSECTION WAS CREATED, BETWEEN THE 'TRUE OBLIGATION OF THE STATE' ('CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 870. IBID]), AND THE 'FALSE OBLIGATION (JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT [82. AND 83.]), OF THE STATE' (WHEREBY THE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, S.A. ([85.]), IS ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY [1.], BEING APPLIED TO SAID LIFERS, TO 'RE-SENTENCE' SAME LIFERS, PER ADMINISTRATIVE

1857. ~~OPERATION OF SAID ACT ([85.])~~, IN CH. II [3.] ONLY (WHICH ITSELF IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL REALM TO 'ALTER' (BY 'INCREASE OF IMPOSED PENALTY OF COURT'S EXISTING SENTENCING ORDER'), THE COMPETENT COURT'S SENTENCE UPON A PERSON CONVICTED OF MURDER, AS SUCH AN EFFECT (ALTERING ('DETRIMENTAL AFFECT' AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER), COURT'S [35. ("COURT")], SENTENCE [35. ("SENTENCE")], 44. ("SENTENCING COURT")]), CAN ONLY BE PERFORMED ACCORDING TO 'PROCEDURAL

1858. DUE PROCESS ACCORDING TO RELEVANT AND COMPETENT LAW' [45., 38. AND 40.]), (AND, AS THE TWO KEY COMPONENTS OF AN IMPOSED SENTENCE, WITH DESIGNATED 'NPP', UPON PERSON CONVICTED OF MURDER, ARE 'HEAD SENTENCE' AND 'NPP', WHICH CAN ALSO ONLY EVER BE DETERMINED, REDETERMINED IN A CH. III [3.] COURT ([194. (PARA. 11.)]), THEN, TO 'INCREASE IMPOSED PENALTY', AND, 'DETRIMENTAL AFFECT', ARE

1859. REFERENCES TO COURT DETERMINED AND IMPOSED 'NPP', SO THAT, AN ENCROACHMENT

- UPON CH. III [3.], JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE (THE REALM OF CH. III [3.]), BY ANY PERSON, PARTY, ENTITY, "STATUTORY INSTRUMENT" [14.], OPERATING OUT OF AUTHORITY CLAIMED TO EXIST PER CORRECTIONAL SERVICE ACT [85.], SUCH AS TO OPERATIONALLY 'CREATE A PERIOD OF TIME' WITHIN WHICH SAID LIFER CAN'T APPLY FOR PAROLE, OR RECEIVE PAROLE, IN EFFECT A 'NPP OF TIME', AND THAT IS THEN
1860. THE DISPLACER OF THE COURT'S IMPOSED 'NPP OF TIME', AND, THEREAFTER REGARDED AND TREATED BY SA GOVERNMENT AND ITS EMPLOYEES/AGENTS, AS THE 'ACTUAL NPP' FROM WHICH SAID LIFERS MAY THEN CONSIDER AS THEIR CURRENT 'NPP DATE', AND ANY ADDITIONAL 'CREATIONS OF PERIOD OF TIME' BY SAME PERSON, PARTY, ENTITY, "STATUTORY INSTRUMENT" [14.], WHICH THEN BECOME THE NEW CURRENT 'NPP DATE',
1861. ALL (OTHER THAN THE RECOGNISED COURT DETERMINED AND IMPOSED 'NPP'), ARE THE PRODUCT OF FALSE AUTHORITY, FALSE JURISDICTION, WHICH THE S.A. GOVERNMENT ERRONEOUSLY CLAIMS TO OWN WITHIN OPERATION OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, AND,
1862. BOTH THE S.A. GOVERNMENT AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, CANNOT CREATE ANY SENTENCE DETERMINATION AGAINST LIFER (IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA), WHICH EXCEEDS STRICT PENALTY OF SENTENCE IMPOSED IN CH. III [3.], BY A COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT, AT THE VERY LEAST, DUE TO BOTH ~~BEING~~ BEING TWO CRITICAL ELEMENTS SO AS TO ~~ENABLE~~ ENABLE COMPLIANCE WITH SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT, WHERE SAME TWO EXIST TO OPERATE WITHIN CH. II [3.], ONLY, AND, SENTENCE ENFORCEMENT CAN ONLY BE CARRIED-OUT WITHIN CH. II [3.], AND, AS AN
1863. INDICATOR OF JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE, 'IF AN IMPOSED SENTENCE ON RESPECTIVE ~~BEING~~ LIFER MUST BE CREATED COMPLIANTLY WITH [45.], WHICH
1864. ITSELF CAN ONLY BE OPERATED DIRECTLY WITHIN CH. III [3.], THEN, 'IF SAID [45.] IS NOT DIRECTLY APPLIED BY A CH. III ([3.]), COMPETENT COURT, TO CREATE, DECIDE, DETERMINE, IMPOSE THE OPERATIONAL SENTENCING STANDARDS, HEAD SENTENCE, AND/OR NON-PAROLE PERIOD OF THE ORDERED SENTENCE (UPON
1865. RESPECTIVE LIFER/LIFERS), THE THING CREATED (SUCH AS ABOVE DESCRIBED, 'NPP OF TIME'), BY S.A. GOVERNMENT OPERATION OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT (~~[85.]~~ 85.),
1866. CANNOT EXIST LAWFULLY AS PART OF IMPOSED SENTENCE' (AND TO FURTHER

QUALIFY THIS POINT, THE THING CREATED (AN ADDITIONAL OR LONGER 'NPP' THAN WAS ORDERED BY THE SENTENCING COURT), WAS NOT CREATED WITHIN, NOR DOES IT EXIST ~~WITHIN~~ WITHIN, PERMITTED ACTIONS, INFLUENCES, CREATIONS OR CONSIDERATIONS 'APPLICABLE' TO RESPECTIVELY IMPOSED SENTENCE, WHICH, IN MY SITUATION [74., 75., 77., 80. AND 78.], TRANSLATES TO A TRUE 'NPP OF TIME' (PER COURT ORDER), AND A FALSE 'NPP OF TIME' (PER STATE GOVERNMENT DETERMINED INTERPRETATION [SEE TEXT AT 938. TO 941. (INCLUSIVE) IBID]), AND A TRUE 'NPP DATE' (PER COURT ORDER), AND A FALSE 'NPP DATE' (PER STATE GOVERNMENT DETERMINED CALCULATION, WHICH THEY DETERMINED AS LATE 2016), AND A TRUE 'PAROLE PERIOD' (PER COURT ORDER [SEE TEXT AT 1616, 1617, 1621. IBID], [80.]), AND A FALSE 'PAROLE PERIOD' (PER ULTRA VIRES/JURISDICTIONALLY INCOMPETENT CREATIONS AND APPLICATIONS BY S.A. PARLIAMENT, AND S.A. GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS RECENTLY EXTENDED TO 'PAROLE UNTIL DEATH' [151.]

[RETURNING TO 1866.]

[RETURNING TO 1858.]

[RETURNING TO TEXT AT 1856.]

1870. WHEREBY,

1871. SAID 'TRUE OBLIGATION' IS ACTUALLY THE "JUDICIAL JUDGMENT" OF THE COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT, THE IMPOSED SENTENCE ([74.], DESCRIBED IN JUDGMENT KNIGHT V VICTORIA [2017] HCA 29, PARAGRAPH 29), AND,

1872. SAID 'FALSE OBLIGATION' IS ACTUALLY THE "LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT" OF THE INCOMPETENT S.A. PARLIAMENT, WHICH APPROVED THE PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS IN 1994, WHICH BECAME [46.], TO THEN BE OPERATIONALLY APPLIED BY

1873. THE INCOMPETENT S.A. GOVERNMENT, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY RE-SENTENCING ALL (THEN) EXISTING LIFERS (WITH 'NPP' AND, SENTENCED PER 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SENTENCING STANDARDS), TO NON-AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT SENTENCES, MOST SIGNIFICANTLY TOO, WAS THE DENIAL OF [126.] TO THEIR EFFECTIVE SENTENCE, AND PAROLE APPLICATIONS, AND PAROLE RECEIPT OF, AND PAROLE START DATE,

1874. AND PAROLE END DATE', SO THAT SUCH LIFERS WERE THEREAFTER INCARCERATED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE 'LIFER SENTENCES', NO LONGER AT THE IMPOSITION

1875. OF THE SENTENCING COURT, BUT INSTEAD, AT THE IMPOSITION OF THE
 'ADMINISTRATIVE RE-SENTENCING ORDER', OF THE JURISDICTIONALLY ~~INCOMPETENT~~
 INCOMPETENT CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT (ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE SOUTH
 AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, AND, THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA), FROM WITHIN
 THE JURISDICTIONALLY FRAUDULENT REALM OF 'CH. II [3.]', CONSEQUENTIAL TO
 1876. THE REPEAL OF THE 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', WHICH CREATED, WITHIN ITS AMENDING
 1877. ACT ([46.]), AS OPERATED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA,
 DIRECTLY (VIA DEPARTMENT FOR PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, ATTORNEY-GENERAL), AND,
 DIRECTLY (VIA S.A. PAROLE BOARD (DEPENDING ON METHOD/AGENCY OF PROCESS, SUCH AS
 CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 'INTERNAL - PROCESSING' OF MATTER BY PAROLE BOARD, OR,
 CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT 'EXTERNAL - PROCESSING' OF MATTER IN A CH. III ([3.]),
 COURT BY DPP OR ATTORNEY-GENERAL)),
 1878. [RETURNING TO TEXT AT 1876.], WHICH CREATED, UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ([1.]),
 A STATUTORY MEANS BY WHICH THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, COULD MANIPULATE
 ITS OBLIGATIONS AS 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', TO 'LEGISLATIVELY DEPRIVE' THE
 RESPECTIVE LIFER, OF THEIR SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF ENTITLEMENTS ANCHORED
 BY THE JUDICIAL SENTENCING ORDER (THEIR IMPOSED SENTENCE AND ITS INTRINSIC
 ACCRUED SENTENCING RIGHTS, HENCE, TITLE OF SENTENCING ACT SENTENCING STANDARDS
 1879. UNDER WHICH THEY WERE SENTENCED, THE AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT), PARTICULARLY
 1880. THOSE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS RELATING TO 'IF A LIFER WILL RECEIVE PAROLE (AFTER
 1881. COMPLETING ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO)', 'EXPECTATION OF RELEASE
 1882. ON PAROLE (AFTER COMPLETING ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO)', 'WHEN
 FULL SATISFACTION OF SENTENCE WILL BE ARRIVED AT (MAXIMUM TEN YEARS PAROLE)',
 1883. 'THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF COURT APPLICATION BY S.A. GOVERNMENT, IF STATE
 GOVERNMENT WANTS TO/INTENDS TO CONTINUE PRISON CUSTODY OF RESPECTIVE LIFER
 (AFTER STATUTORY APPLICATION OF 'REMISSIONS SYSTEM', PAROLE RELEASE CALCULATED
 DATE (30 DAY WINDOW [126.])), RATHER THAN PAROLE RELEASE TO PAROLE CUSTODY OF
 RESPECTIVE LIFER (AS LIFER IS STILL IN CUSTODY ~~OF~~ OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT'S
 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, EVEN ON PAROLE, EXCEPT THAT WHILE ON PAROLE SAID LIFER IS
 1884. NOT A PRISONER AND IS NOT HOUSED/ACCOMMODATED IN A PRISON)', 'THE STATUTORY

REQUIREMENT (MANDATORY COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENT), OF APPLICATION OF [45.], TO ALL ACTIONS OF 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' (STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, CH. II [3.]), WHICH RELATE^{TO} PERIOD OF TIME IN PRISON, ON PAROLE, WHEN APPLY FOR PAROLE, WHEN PERMITTED TO RECEIVE PAROLE, WHO HAS JURISDICTION TO GRANT/REFUSE PAROLE RELEASE, WHEN AND BY WHAT ACTION/EVENT/THING IS SENTENCE "WHOLLY SATISFIED", AS PER SPECIFIC SENTENCING STANDARDS IMPOSED BY SENTENCING COURT (ESPECIALLY DUE TO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMPETENT AND PERMITTED JURISDICTIONAL DECISIONS/ACTIONS, WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE OPEN/AVAILABLE TO 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', DEPENDING ON IMPOSED SENTENCE UPON RESPECTIVE LIFER)', DESCRIBED FURTHER IN [TEXT AT 1603, 1608 TO 1644, (INCLUSIVE) IBID.],

1885. HOWEVER,

BY OPERATION OF [46.], IN THE MANNER DONE BY S.A. GOVERNMENT SINCE 1-8-1994, AND ITS SUBSEQUENT AMENDED PROVISIONS (POISONED FRUIT FROM A POISONED TREE, THE TREE BEING [46.] AS AT 1-8-1994), THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA HAS 'ADMINISTRATIVELY RE-SENTENCED' SUCH LIFERS [SEE TEXT AT 1874, 1875. IBID.], USING STATE PARLIAMENT (CH. I [1. AND 3.]), AND STATE

1886. GOVERNMENT (CH. II [1. AND 3.]), EVEN THOUGH, IRONICALLY, AND WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO COMPETENT IMPOSED SENTENCES PURSUANT TO 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SENTENCING STANDARDS, ~~NO~~ NO COMPETENT DECISION, ORDER, DETERMINATION, OUTCOME OR ACTION, CAN BE CREATED/EFFECTED/DONE BY ANY CH. II [3.], PERSON/S, ENTITY OR AGENCY, 'DUE TO JURISDICTIONAL ERROR/FRAUD/IMPROPRIETY' [82. AND 83.], IF (FIRST, PRIMARY), PRE-REQUISITE RIGHT TO SO ACT, IS NOT HELD BY/OPEN TO SUCH CH. II

1887. [3.], PERSON/S, ENTITY OR AGENCY, AND, EVEN IF SAID PRE-REQUISITE RIGHT TO SO ACT, IS HELD BY/OPEN TO THE CH. II [3.], PERSON/S, ENTITY OR AGENCY, DO THEY ALSO

1888. HOLD/HAVE OPEN TO THEM, COMPETENT JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY, TO SO ACT (PLUS, CONDITIONAL JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY MUST ONLY BE EFFECTED WITHIN CH. III [3.], 'SENTENCING/RE-SENTENCING HEARING' IF SUBJECT MATTER IS 'PENALTY OF SENTENCING OPERATIONAL EFFECT' (SUCH AS 'NPP' AND INTRINSIC ATTACHMENTS TO ~~THE~~ SAME [SEE TEXT AT 1612. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE) IBID.]), WHEREBY THE LIBERTY

OF RESPECTIVE LIFER (FROM 'PRISON CUSTODY' AND/OR 'PAROLE CUSTODY' [SEE TEXT AT 1883. IBID]), IS BEING ATTACKED/IMPACTED TO A GREATER EXTENT/EFFECT, THAN EXISTING IMPOSED SENTENCE, AS SUCH AN ATTACK (PER DUE PROCESS OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL LAW COMPLIANCE, RELATING TO SENTENCING A LIFER IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA), INCURS STATUTORY PROTECTION OF [45.], THEREFORE, SUCH AN ATTACK CANNOT EVER BE ACTIONED FROM CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT, S.A., OR FROM ANY PERSON/S, ENTITY OR AGENCY WHICH EXISTS OR EVEN CONDUCTS ITS ACTIVITIES, EITHER WITHIN CH. I [3.] (STATE PARLIAMENT), ONLY, OR, WITHIN CH. II [3.] (STATE GOVERNMENT), ONLY, OR, WITHIN COMBINED CH. I AND CH. II [3.] (STATE PARLIAMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENT), ACTIVITIES ([SEE TEXT AT 1524. TO 1544, (INCLUSIVE). IBID])),

1889. AND, [RETURN TO 1888.]

WHERE NO COMPETENT JURISDICTION OR AUTHORITY ARE OPEN TO 'ADMINISTRATIVELY CREATE AN EFFECTIVELY NEW SENTENCE ORDER ([SEE TEXT AT 1875. IBID], [82. AND 83.], [194. (PARA. 11.)])', SUCH AS THAT IDENTIFIED BY ME [REDACTED]

1890. WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT AS A 'FAKE SENTENCE' (WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CHANGE OF MY 2002 COURT'S IMPOSED NON-PAROLE PERIOD RE-SENTENCING [74. AND 80.], CALCULATING TO '2009 NPP', BUT WHICH THE S.A. GOVERNMENT, FROM WITHIN CH. II [3.], ONLY, THEN 'ADMINISTRATIVELY CREATED A FAKE NEW SENTENCE ORDER', WHICH CALCULATED TO '2016 (NOVEMBER), AS WHAT THEY CLAIM TO BE MY ACTUAL 'NPP' DATE' [SEE TEXT AT 938. TO 941. (INCLUSIVE) IBID]),

1891. THEN, THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH AN 'ADMINISTRATIVELY CREATED (NEW) SENTENCE ORDER', AGAINST SAID LIFER, CANNOT EXIST WITHIN THE LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE [1., 3., 44., 45., 84., 82. AND 83.],

1892. AND, THEREFORE, MUST BE EXPUNGED FROM PROCEDURAL INFLUENCE SO THAT THE RESPECTIVE LIFER'S TRUE SENTENCE (IMPOSED), ONLY, IS THE SINGLE PROCEDURAL

1893. INFLUENCE 'TOWARD PROGRESS AND SATISFACTION OF IMPOSED SENTENCE (BY THE COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT' (WHICH DOES NOT MEAN JUST THE SENTENCING COURT EITHER, ONLY THE SENTENCING COURT WHICH IS COMPETENT BECAUSE IT CORRECTLY IMPOSED RESPECTIVE LIFER'S ACCURATE SENTENCING STANDARDS),

- WHEREBY COURT'S COMPETENCE IS DETERMINED BY CORRECT SENTENCING STANDARDS
1894. ACTUALLY BEING IMPOSED BY RESPECTIVE COURT (FOLLOWING THE FOUNDATION APPROACH WHICH MY COURT RECOGNISED, ACCEPTED, USED, DETERMINED ACCORDING TO, THEN, IMPOSED [74., 79. AND 80.], [72. ("THIS COURT IS REQUIRED TO APPLY THE STANDARDS APPLICABLE AT THE TIME THE CRIMES WERE COMMITTED."), 131. ("NOR SHALL A HEAVIER PENALTY BE IMPOSED THAN THE ONE THAT WAS APPLICABLE AT THE TIME THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE WAS COMMITTED.")]),
1895. WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE DISTINCTION CHARACTERISED BY THE HIGH COURT AS A TRUE JUDGMENT, THE "JUDICIAL JUDGMENT" [SEE TEXT AT 1871. IBID], COULD ONLY EVER BE A COMPETENT COURT'S IMPOSED SENTENCE ORDER/S,
1896. ALSO, AND IT IS APPROPRIATE TO HIGHLIGHT, A FALSE SENTENCE/FALSE JUDGMENT, THE "LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT" [SEE TEXT AT 1872, 1873. IBID], COULD NOT EVER BE THE COURT'S ACTUAL AND TRUE IMPOSED SENTENCE ORDER, AS DESCRIBED HEREIN, RE 'FAKE SENTENCE' CREATION, AS IT IS (PER RESPECTIVE LIFER'S TRUE SENTENCING ORDER, PURSUANT TO 'AUTOMATIC
1897. PAROLE ACT' SENTENCING STANDARDS), A CH. II [3.] CREATION (NOT EQUAL TO, OR LESS THAN, THE ACTUAL PENALTY OF COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, WHICH IS GOVERNED BY ABSOLUTE COMPLIANCE WITH ONLY THAT WHICH IS OPEN TO APPLICATIONAL DELIVERANCE, ~~████~~ UPON RESPECTIVE LIFER, BY THE 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' (THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA), WHICH THEREFORE MUST BE ALREADY INCORPORATED WITHIN THE STRICT WORDING OF RESPECTIVE LIFER'S IMPOSED SENTENCE (WHICH ITSELF INCLUDES STRICT ORDER/S OF THE
1898. SENTENCING COURT, AND ALSO, THE SENTENCING REMARKS PROPER), OTHERWISE, IF A PARTICULAR 'ACTION/EVENT/CONSIDERATION/DECISION' IS NOT OPEN FOR CONSIDERATION, DETERMINATION, APPLICATION (BY 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER'), THEN IT IS NOT AVAILABLE TO BE DEPOSITED AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER BY ANY MEANS, ESPECIALLY IF TO THEN DEPOSIT ~~██~~ SUCH 'ACTION/EVENT/CONSIDERATION/DECISION', IMPOSES/BURDENS/IMPACTS RESPECTIVE LIFER WITH INCREASED SENTENCE PENALTY (THAN COURT'S SENTENCE ORDER ACTUALLY PERMITS), THAN WAS ACTUALLY POSSIBLE, DUE TO ANY PARTICULAR 'RESTRICTIONS, LIMITATIONS,

- BOUNDARIES' WHICH ARE INTRINSIC TO (FORM THE EXISTENCE OF), THE IMPOSED COURT'S
1899. SENTENCE (WITH EXAMPLES OF SUCH 'DEPOSITED ACTIONS/DECISIONS OUTSIDE AND EXCEEDING ~~SENTENCE~~ SENTENCE ORDER RESTRICTIONS, AND BURDENING IMPACT OF COURT'S SENTENCE PENALTY', NOT OPEN TO CREATION BY 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', BUT STILL ACTIONED AGAINST ME, RE MY 2002 JUDGMENT [74.], INCLUDE
1900. COURT'S SENTENCE [80. AND 78.], WHICH THEN RESTRICTS CALCULATION OF ACTUAL 'NPP DATE' [SEE TEXT AT 1611. TO ¹⁶¹⁵ ~~1615~~. (INCLUSIVE) IBID], TO 2009 [75. AND 77.],
1901. AND, THAT WAS ~~EXCEEDED~~ BY 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', TO THEN DEPOSIT 'FALSE 'NPP DATE' OF 2016 (NOVEMBER)', [SEE TEXT AT 938, TO 941. (INCLUSIVE) IBID], BURDENING ME WITH AN EXTRA 7. YEARS 'NPP OF TIME' (BEFORE S.A. GOVERNMENT WOULD ACCEPT ANY PAROLE RELEASE APPLICATION FORM SUBMISSION FROM ME), THEREBY VIOLATING ITS OBLIGATION TO ONLY ENFORCE COURT'S SENTENCE [SEE TEXT AT 1618. IBID], [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 870. IBID],
- AND,
1902. MY COURT'S SENTENCE [80.], RESTRICTS THE 'LEGAL ABILITY' OF S.A. GOVERNMENT TO 'HOLD ME IN PRISON CUSTODY' UP TO ^{ONLY THE} ~~OPERATIONAL~~ ^{EFFECT} OF [126.], BEING THE YEAR 2009 [74.], AT WHICH POINT I MUST BE ADMINISTRATIVELY PAROLE-RELEASED, PER OPERATIONAL EFFECT OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' [79., 78., 80., 75. AND 77.], AND THEREFROM SERVE OUT MAXIMUM 10. YEARS PAROLE, WHICH WOULD THEN END LATE 2019, AT WHICH POINT MY ENTIRE SENTENCE MUST BE ACCEPTED BY S.A. GOVERNMENT AS "WHOLLY SATISFIED" [SEE TEXT AT 1611. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE)
1903. IBID], AND, 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' EXCEEDED ITS SAID 'LEGAL ABILITY' (IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY IMPOSED SENTENCE ORDERS [80.], WHICH ONLY PERMITS 1992 SENTENCING STANDARDS, AND ITS INCORPORATED AND INTRINSIC 'SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHTS', TO THEN BE ENFORCED AGAINST ME, AS DESCRIBED IN ANDREWS [207. (PARA. 20.)]), THEN, DEPOSITED 'FAKE/FALSE CUSTODY IN PRISON', BURDENING ME WITH (AS AT NOVEMBER 2017), A TERM OF PRISON INCARCERATION ALREADY MORE PENALISING (OF AT LEAST 8 YEARS), THAN MY ACTUAL SENTENCE IMPOSED [74.], THEREBY VIOLATING ITS OBLIGATION TO ONLY ENFORCE COURT'S SENTENCE [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 870, 1864, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869. (INCLUSIVE) IBID]'),

[RETURNING TO 1899.]

1904. WHEREBY, CONSEQUENTIAL TO [74.] BEING A CH.III [3.], COURT'S CREATION, A PROSPECTIVE BOUNDARY, LIMITATION, RESTRICTION, WHICH FOUNDS AN UNDERSTANDING, APPRECIATION AND ACCEPTED OUTCOME OF AND FOR IMPOSED SENTENCE (BY THE RESPECTIVE SENTENCING COURT), PURSUANT TO 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SENTENCING STANDARDS, MUST ANCHOR TO SUCH THINGS THAT CAN BE JUDICIALLY PROTECTED, AND,
1905. ANYONE ATTEMPTS TO VIOLATE SUCH 'BOUNDARY', 'LIMITATION' OR 'RESTRICTION',
1906. SUCH AS, THE MAXIMUM PAROLE PERIOD WHICH 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' IS ADMINISTRATIVELY PERMITTED, LIMITED AND RESTRICTED TO ORDERING AGAINST PAROLE APPLICANT (PER. 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SENTENCING STANDARDS, WHICH WERE ALSO STILL IN 'OPERATIONAL DELIVERY EXISTENCE' UP TO EARLY 2016), AS A STATUTORY SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHT, WAS 10 YEARS [207. (PARA. 20.)] ([SEE TEXT AT 1612. TO 1616, 1619. TO 1644. (INCLUSIVE) IBID]), WHICH IS A STATUTORY RESTRICTION DUE TO 'CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ACT ([85.])', BOARD'S PERMITTED ACTIONS, PAROLE 'MAXIMUM' PERMITTED PERIOD OF TIME ON PAROLE, UNDER BOARD'S
1907. CONDITIONS OF RELEASE AGAINST RESPECTIVE LIFER, THEN, ANOTHER LIMITATION AND RESTRICTION BECOMES OPERATIONAL, AT THE END OF 10 YEAR PAROLE MAXIMUM PERIOD, WHICH IS ALSO A 'STATUTORY SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHT', BEING, 'FULLY SATISFIED SENTENCE (OF SENTENCE ORDER WHICH INCLUDED MANDATORY 'LIFE' UPON MURDER CONVICTION)', [SEE TEXT AT 1616, 1617, 1618. IBID], AND IS EMBODIED WITHIN THE ACTUAL IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND, IS ALSO JUDICIALLY PROTECTED AS A STANDING COURT ORDER, WHICH ONLY A COMPETENT COURT IS JURISDICTIONALLY AUTHORISED TO INCREASE PENALTY OF TOO [194. (PARA. 11.)],

[RETURNING TO 1905.]

1908. MUST APPEAR BEFORE A CH.III [3.], COMPETENT COURT AND RESPOND TO THE RESPECTIVE LIFER'S ACCUSATION OF VIOLATION OF COURT'S SENTENCE ORDER/S, AND THE VIOLATOR WOULD BE THE 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' (THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, INCORPORATING DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECTIONAL
1909. SERVICES, AND, PAROLE BOARD, AND, ATTORNEY-GENERAL, AND, PREMIER), AND, MUST INFORM SAID COURT OF WHY IT VIOLATED THE 'BOUNDARY' OF IMPOSED SENTENCE ORDER/S,

1910. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE IMPOSED SENTENCE (SUCH AS 'MAXIMUM PERMITTED PAROLE TERM OF 10. YEARS', AND, 'OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE END OF SENTENCE', AND, 'OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE MANDATORY PAROLE RELEASE AND PER. CALCULATED DATES TO START FROM' [126.], [SEE TEXT AT 1611. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE) IBID]),
1911. WAS TREATED AS MANIPULATEABLE AND LIMP, BY 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', AND ALSO INFORM SAME COURT, OF HOW IT CAN JUSTIFY BREACHING THE
1912. OPERATIONAL 'RESTRICTIONS' OF CH. II [3.] (TO ONLY ENFORCE SENTENCE ORDERS [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 870. IBID], AS IMPOSED BY COMPETENT SENTENCING COURT WITHIN THE ~~RELEVANT~~ DIRECTED SENTENCING STANDARDS (RESPECTIVE SENTENCE PER 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT', FOR MY 2002 SENTENCE [74.], THE 1992 STANDARDS
1913. WERE ORDERED [80.]), WITHOUT EVEN RETURNING TO COMPETENT COURT SO AS TO SEEK CONFIRMATION (JUDICIAL), OF THEIR CLAIMED INTERPRETATION, AND, FROM WHERE DO THEY CLAIM CONSTITUTIONAL [1. AND 3.], JURISDICTION/AUTHORITY TO DISREGARD COURT'S SPECIFIC SENTENCING ORDERS, OF APPLICATION OF 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHT FEATURES [SEE TEXT AT 1611. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE) IBID], [80.]),
- [RETURNING TO ~~RELEVANT~~ 1897.]
1914. AND, AS DESCRIBED WITHIN THIS DOCUMENT SEVERAL TIMES ALREADY, A CH. II ([3.]), ADMINISTRATIVE PERSON, BODY, ENTITY, ETC. CANNOT HEAR, CONSIDER, DETERMINE IF A SENTENCED LIFER, CONSEQUENTIAL TO [74. AND 80.], SPECIFIC TO ME, OR ANY OTHER LIFER COMPETENTLY SENTENCED TO 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SENTENCING STANDARDS, IS SUBSTANTIVELY RIGHTED TO ANY SPECIFICALLY CHALLENGED DECISION/DETERMINATION OUTCOME, WHERE ONLY A CH. III [3.], COMPETENT COURT HOLDS/HAS OPEN TO THEM. THE JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY
1915. TO SO ACT ([82. AND 83.], WHERE DECISION/OUTCOME IS DETERMINED, AGAINST SUCH A LIFER, AND CONSEQUENTIAL OUTCOME IS NOT EVEN OPEN TO EXIST UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, IF IT IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DECIDED/OUTCOMED BY CH. III [3.], COMPETENT COURT),
1916. AND, AN EXAMPLE IS, RE MY 2002 SENTENCE ORDERS [74.], WHICH THEREIN ORDERED (FULL COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, SENTENCING HEARING),

- THAT "THIS COURT MUST APPLY..." [80.], WHICH MEANS, WHEN OBSERVING DUE
1917. PROCESS APPLICATION OF RELEVANT LAWS (STATUTORY AND JUDGE-MADE), THAT SAID COURT ("THIS COURT"), IS UNDER COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO HEAR SUCH MATTER,
1918. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOT HOLD OPEN TO IT ANY COMPETENT AUTHORITY TO MAKE ANY 'OTHER' DECISION/OUTCOME, CONSEQUENTIAL TO THE THEN IMPOSITION OF "MUST" [30. ("SHALL", "... IN ANY SUCH ACT THE WORD "SHALL" IS USED IN CONFERRING A POWER, IT IMPLIES THAT THE POWER MUST BE EXERCISED.")], OTHER THAN WHAT SAID COURT ORDERS ITSELF TO DO, BEING, "MUST APPLY", TO WHICH IT THEN NOTIFIES AND INFORMS ITSELF OF WHAT IT MUST APPLY, BEING, "SENTENCING
1919. STANDARDS APPLICABLE IN 1992." [80.], THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH SAID COURT HELD JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE (WITHIN CONFINED AUTHORITY RELATING TO WHAT OUTCOMES IT WAS PERMITTED TO CREATE AND IMPOSE), THERE NOT ONLY EXISTED RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON WHAT SENTENCE ORDERS IT COULD IMPOSE, BUT ADDITIONALLY, SUCH 'RESTRICTIONS' AND 'LIMITATIONS' MUST CARRY-ON FOR ENTIRE TERM OF IMPOSED SENTENCE,
1920. DUE TO THE FOUNDATION SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHT FEATURES [SEE TEXT AT 1913. IBID], WHICH FUNDAMENTALLY ANCHORED A VERY RESTRICTIVE PERIOD OF TIME, WITHIN WHICH, THE ENTIRE IMPOSED SENTENCE COULD BE "WHOLLY SATISFIED"
1921. [SEE TEXT AT 1616, 1617. IBID] (FROM RESPECTIVE LIFER'S PERSPECTIVE, INCLUDING ME, PER ORIGINAL SENTENCING BY TRIAL JUDGE, AND, RE-SENTENCING [212.], STILL PER 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SENTENCING STANDARDS [75.], AND, RE-SENTENCING [74., 80.,
1922. 78. AND 77.]), IF RESPECTIVE LIFER COMPLIED WITH RELEVANT STATUTORY
1923. 'COMPLIANCE ANCHORS' (DRAWING FROM [207. (PARA. 20.)], WHICH PROCEDURALLY SUGGESTS "s. 66.(5)(B)", TO BE LIKELY THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STATUTORY 'COMPLIANCE' REQUIREMENT, 'ANCHORING' TO THE STATUTORY OBLIGATION OF THE 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', THAT 'IT' MUST THEN PAROLE-RELEASE SUCH LIFER, AS THERE WOULD NOT EXIST, AGAINST SUCH LIFER, ANY PROCEDURAL PRE-CONDITION TO WHICH 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' COULD REFUSE TO PAROLE-RELEASE, HENCE TITLE ACT, 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' [SEE TEXT AT 846, 847, 870, 1611. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE) IBID]),

[RETURNING TO 1920.]

1924. DUE TO THE FOUNDATION SUBSTANTIVE/ACCRUED RIGHT FEATURES [SEE TEXT AT 1913. IBID], WHICH FUNDAMENTALLY ANCHORED A VERY RESTRICTIVE PERIOD OF TIME, WITHIN WHICH, THE ENTIRE IMPOSED SENTENCE MUST BE "WHOLLY SATISFIED"
1925. [SEE TEXT AT 1616, ~~1616~~ 1617. IBID] (FROM 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER'S' PERSPECTIVE, WHEN OBSERVING, APPLYING AND ENFORCING RESPECTIVE LIFER'S COURT
1926. IMPOSED SENTENCE, MANDATING 'ENFORCEMENT OF ONLY THOSE ELEMENTS/COMPONENTS OF SENTENCE OPEN TO USE AND IMPOSITION, BY SUCH SENTENCING COURT, EVEN IF
1927. EXTRA-ORDINARY IN NATURE AND CHARACTER (WHEN COMPARED TO 'OTHER' LIFER SENTENCES DELIVERED AROUND THE SAME TIME (2002, RE MY SENTENCE [74.]))
SUCH AS [74., 79., 78., 80. AND 77.], WHEREBY [80.], VOIDS AND ABROGATES ([78.]), AND EXPLAINS ITS REPLACEMENT [79., 75. AND 77.], SO THAT THE REASONING OF SAID
1928. COURT WAS EASILY INTERPRETED, AND, WITHIN SAID REASONING WAS AN UNCHALLENGED (BY THE SENTENCING JUDGES THEMSELVES OR EVEN THE PROSECUTOR/CROWN SOLICITOR), ORDER OF THE COURT WHICH COULD NOT BE COMPETENTLY REFUSED COMPLIANCE WITH, 'BY THE 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' (THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, ITS EMPLOYEES, INCORPORATING DCS. [85.], ALSO), OR ANY OTHER PERSON WHO MAY NOT BE A STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE, BUT DOES STILL ACT ON BEHALF OF STATE GOVERNMENT AS PART OF BUSINESS OPERATIONS, WHICH THEREFORE INCLUDES PRIVATE ENTITIES MANAGING STATE GOVERNMENT CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, AND, MANAGEMENT OF STATE'S PRISONERS (UNDER [85.] CUSTODY)', IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND PURSUANT TO 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' SENTENCING STANDARDS (IN LINE WITH [80., 75., 77.
1929. AND 74.]))', IF RESPECTIVE LIFER COMPLIES WITH ALL RELEVANT STATUTORY
1930. 'COMPLIANCE ANCHORS' (DRAWING FROM [207. (PARA. 20.)], WHICH PROCEDURALLY DICTATE TO S.A. GOVERNMENT WHAT MUST BE DONE, SO AS TO LAWFULLY ENFORCE RESPECTIVE LIFER'S IMPOSED SENTENCE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ORDERS OF THE SENTENCING COURT, SUGGESTING ALSO THAT "s. 66.(1.)", IS LIKELY THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STATUTORY 'COMPLIANCE' REQUIREMENT, TOGETHER WITH "s. 66.(2)(A)(ii), s. 66.(2)(B), s. 66.(3)(A), s. 66.(3)(B)", 'ANCHORING' TO THE STATUTORY OBLIGATION OF THE 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', THAT 'IT' MUST COMMENCE PAROLE-RELEASE

- OF RESPECTIVE LIFER, AT A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF TIME ("s. 66.(1)"), AS THERE WOULD NOT EXIST, EITHER AGAINST SAID LIFER, OR, TO THE CONVERSE ADVANTAGE/BENEFIT OF THE 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER', ANY PROCEDURAL CONDITION/PRE-REQUISITE TO WHICH
1931. 'CUSTODIAL SENTENCE ENFORCER' COULD REFUSE TO PAROLE-RELEASE (WITHIN SAID 30 DAY WINDOW PERIOD AS DEFINED AND CALCULATED BY THE ABSOLUTENESS, IN TEXT, CREATED BY PARLIAMENT ("s. 66.(1)"), IMPOSED UPON ME BY MY SENTENCING COURT [80.], ABROGATING IN SAID COURT'S ORDER AND INTENTIONS [78., 77., 75. AND 72.],
1932. OF THE DISTINCTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES, DATES, PERIODS OF TIME, ETC., WHICH MUST BE INTRINSICALLY OBSERVED AND APPLIED BY S.A. GOVERNMENT, WHILST IT CARRIES-OUT ITS CONSTITUTIONAL [1.] OBLIGATION OF [REDACTED] COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, TO THE EXPECTATION OF THE COURT WHEN RESPECTIVE SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED UPON ME [74., 77. AND 80.], [SEE TEXT AT 1537. TO 1570. (INCLUSIVE) IBID], [SEE TEXT AT 870. TO 884. (INCLUSIVE) IBID], HENCE TITLE ACT, 'AUTOMATIC PAROLE ACT' [SEE TEXT AT 1611. TO 1618. (INCLUSIVE) IBID],
- [RETURN TO 1929.] (AND RE-READ)
- [RETURN TO 1922.] (AND RE-READ)
1933. SO THAT, [RETURN TO [REDACTED] 1919. AND RESTATE], AND THEREFORE,
1934. ENFORCEMENT OF MY 2002 NEWLY IMPOSED 'NPP' [74.], AS STRICTLY WORDED THEREIN, MUST CARRY-ON UNTIL SAID SENTENCE 'ENGAGES/EFFECTS' A 'CIRCUMSTANCE/CONDITION', WHICH, WITHIN SUCH, CAUSES SENTENCE TO BE 'SERVED' (AND NO LONGER PENDING COMPLETION OF), 'REPLACED' (VIA RE-SENTENCING COURT AND A NEW 'NPP' MUST BE CREATED TO REPLACE EXISTING SENTENCE ([74.])), 'EXTINGUISHED' (WHEN CONVICTION
1935. IS OVERTURNED), WITH THE MOST RELEVANT TO THE ACTUAL IMPOSED SENTENCE, WHICH FORMS PART OF THE INTRINSICALLY INCORPORATED AND IMPOSED SENTENCE, AND IS ALSO
1936. THEREFORE PROTECTED BY AND AS 'THE SENTENCING ORDER', BEING, THAT WHICH 'CAUSES' AND/OR 'DETERMINES' MY IMPOSED SENTENCE (NOT JUST THE 'NPP', BUT IN FACT THE ENTIRE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT IN 2002, INCLUDING 'HEAD SENTENCE', SO THAT MY SENTENCE IMPOSED IS 'FULLY SERVED' [74.]), TO BE "WHOLLY SATISFIED" AND I HAVE NO MORE SENTENCE TIME TO REPAY TO THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA,
- [REDACTED]